(a) Under the provisions of sections 9 and 10 of the Portal Act, an employer has a defense against liability or punishment in any action or proceeding brought against him for failure to comply with the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, where the employer pleads and proves that ``the act or omission complained of was in good faith in conformity with and in reliance on any administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpretation'' or ``any administrative practice or enforcement policy * * * with respect to the class of employers to which he belonged.'' In order to provide a defense with respect to acts or omissions occurring on or after May 14, 1947 (the effective date of the Portal Act), the regulation, order, ruling, approval, interpretation, administrative practice or enforcement policy relied upon and conformed with must be that of the ``Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor,'' and a regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpretation of the Administrator may be relied on only if it is in writing. \88\ But where the acts or omissions complained of occurred before May 14, 1947, the employer may show that they were in good faith in conformity with and in reliance on ``any'' (written or nonwritten) administrative regulation, order, ruling, or interpretation of ``any agency of the United States,'' or any administrative practice or enforcement policy of ``any such agency'' with respect to the class of employers to which he belonged. \89\ In all cases, however, the act or omission complained of must be both ``in conformity with'' \90\ and ``in reliance on'' \91\ the administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, interpretation, practice, or enforcement policy, as the case may be, and such conformance and reliance and such act or omission must be ``in good faith.'' \92\ The relief from liability or punishment provided by sections 9 and 10 of the Portal Act is limited by the statute to employers who both plead and prove all the requirements of the defence. \93\---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ Portal Act, sec. 10; Conference Report, p. 16; statements of Senator Wiley, explaining the conference agreement to the Senate, 93 Cong. Rec. 4270; statements of Representatives Gwynne and Walter, explaining the conference agreement to the House of Representatives, 93 Cong. Rec. 4388, 4389. See also Sec. Sec. 790.17 and 790.19.
\89\ Portal Act, sec. 10; Conference Report, p. 16; statement of Senator Wiley, explaining the conference agreement to the Senate, 93 Cong. Rec. 4270; statements of Representatives Gwynne and Walter, 93 Cong. Rec. 4388, 4389. See also Sec. 790.19.
\90\ See Sec. 790.14.
\91\ See Sec. 790.16.
\92\ See Sec. 790.15.
\93\ Conference Report, pp. 15, 16; statements of Representatives Gwynne and Walter, explaining the conference agreement to the House of Representatives, 93 Cong. Rec. 4388, 4389; statements of Senators Cooper and Donnell, 93 Cong. Rec. 4372, 4451, 4452. See also the President's message of May 14, 1947, to the Congress on approval of the Act (93 Cong. Rec. 5281).
The requirements of the statute as to pleading and proof emphasize the continuing recognition by Congress of the remedial nature of the Fair Labor Standards Act and of the need for safeguarding the protection which Congress intended it to afford employees. See Sec. 790.2; of. statements of Senator Wiley, 93 Cong. Rec. 4270; Senator Donnell, 93 Cong. Rec. 4452, and Representative Walter, 93 Cong. Rec. 4388, 4389.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) The distinctions mentioned in paragraph (a) of this section, depending on whether the acts or omissions complained of occurred before or after May 14, 1947, may be illustrated as follows: Assume that an employer, on commencing performance of a contract with X Federal Agency extending from January 1, 1947 to January 1, 1948, received an opinion from the agency that employees working under the contract were not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act. Assume further that the employer may be said to have relied in good faith upon this opinion and therefore did not compensate such employees during the period of the contract in accordance with the provisions of the Act. After completion of the contract on January 1, 1948, the employees, who have learned that they are probably covered by the Act, bring suit against their employer for unpaid overtime compensation which they claim is due them. If the court finds that the employees were performing work subject to the Act, they can recover for the period commencing May 14, 1947, even though the employer pleads and proves that his failure to pay overtime was in good faith in conformity with and in reliance on the opinion of X Agency, because for that period the defense would, under section 10 of the Portal Act, have to be based upon written administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpretation, or an administrative practice or enforcement policy of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division. The defense would, however, be good for the period from January 1, 1947 to May 14, 1947, and the employer would be freed from liability for that period under the provisions of section 9 of the statute. Sec. 790.14 ``In conformity with.''
(a) The ``good faith'' defense is not available to an employer unless the acts or omissions complained of were ``in conformity with'' the regulation, order, ruling, approval, interpretation, administrative practice or enforcement policy upon which he relied. \94\ This is true even though the employer erroneously believes he conformed with it and in good faith relied upon it; actual conformity is necessary.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\94\ Statement of Senator Cooper, 93 Cong. Rec. 4451; message of the President to Congress on approval of the Act, May 14, 1947, 93 Cong. Rec. 5281.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) An example of an employer not acting ``in conformity with'' an administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, practice, or enforcement policy is a situation where an employer receives a letter from the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, stating that if certain specified circumstances and facts regarding the work performed by the employer's employees exist, the employees are, in his opinion, exempt from provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. One of these hypothetical circumstances upon which the opinion was based does not exist regarding these employees, but the employer, erroneously assuming that this circumstance is irrelevant, relies upon the Administrator's ruling and fails to compensate the employees in accordance with the Act. Since he did not act ``in conformity'' with that opinion, he has no defense under section 9 or 10 of the Portal Act.
(c) As a further example of the requirement of conformity, reference is made to the illustration given in Sec. 790.13(b), where an employer, who had a contract with the X Federal Agency covering the period from January 1, 1947 to January 1, 1948, received an opinion from the agency that employees working on the contract were not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act. Assume (1) that the X Agency's opinion was confined solely and exclusively to activities performed under the particular contract held by the employer with the agency and made no general statement regarding the status under the Act of the employer's employees while performing other work; and (2) that the employer, erroneously believing the reasoning used in the agency's opinion also applied to other and different work performed by his employees, did not compensate them for such different work, relying upon that opinion. As previously pointed out, the opinion from the X Agency, if relied on and conformed with in good faith by the employer, would form the basis of a ``good faith'' defense for the period prior to May 14, 1947, insofar as the work performed by the employees on this particular contract with that agency was concerned. The opinion would not, however, furnish the employer a defense regarding any other activities of a different nature performed by his employees, because it was not an opinion concerning such activities, and insofar as those activities are concerned, the employer could not act ``in conformity'' with it. Sec. 790.15 ``Good faith.''
(a) One of the most important requirements of sections 9 and 10 is proof by the employer that the act or omission complained of and his conformance with and reliance upon an administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, interpretation, practice or enforcement policy, were in good faith. The legislative history of the Portal Act makes it clear that the employer's ``good faith'' is not to be determined merely from the actual state of his mind. Statements made in the House and Senate indicate that ``good faith'' also depends upon an objective test--whether the employer, in acting or omitting to act as he did, and in relying upon the regulation, order, ruling, approval, interpretation, administrative practice or enforcement policy, acted as a reasonably prudent man would have acted under the same or similar circumstances. \95\ ``Good faith'' requires that the employer have honesty of intention and no knowledge of circumstances which ought to put him upon inquiry. \96\---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\ Colloquy between Representatives Reeves and Devitt, 93 Cong. Rec. 1593; colloquy between Senators Ferguson and Donnell, 93 Cong. Rec. 4451-4452.
\96\ See statement of Senator McGrath, 93 Cong. Rec. 2254-2255; statement of Representative Keating, 93 Cong. Rec. 4391; statement of Representative Walter, 93 Cong. Rec. 4389.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Some situations illustrating the application of the principles stated in paragraph (a) of this section may be mentioned. Assume that a ruling from the Administrator, stating positively that the Fair Labor Standards Act does not apply to certain employees, is received by an employer in response to a request which fully described the duties of the employees and the circumstances surrounding their employment. It is clear that the employer's employment of such employees in such duties and under such circumstances in reliance on the Administrator's ruling, without compensating them in accordance with the Act, would be in good faith so long as the ruling remained unrevoked and the employer had no notice of any facts or circumstances which would lead a reasonably prudent man to make further inquiry as to whether the employees came within the Act's provisions. Assume, however, that the Administrator's ruling was expressly based on certain court decisions holding that employees so engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, and that the employer subsequently learned from his attorney that a higher court had reversed these decisions or had cast doubt on their correctness by holding employees similarly situated to be engaged in an occupation necessary to the production of goods for interstate commerce. Assume further that the employer, after learning of this, made no further inquiry but continued to pay the employees without regard to the requirements of the Act in reliance on the Administrator's earlier ruling. In such a situation, if the employees later brought an action against the employer, the court might determine that they were entitled to the benefits of the Act and might decide that the employer, after learning of the decision of the higher court, knew facts which would put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry and therefore had not provided his good faith in relying upon the Administrator's ruling after receiving this advice.
(c) In order to illustrate further the test of ``good faith,'' suppose that the X Federal Agency published a general bulletin regarding manufacturing, which contained the erroneous statement that all foremen are exempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act as employed in a ``bona fide executive * * * capacity.'' Suppose also that an employer knowing that the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division is charged with the duties of administering the Fair Labor Standards Act and of defining the phrase ``bona fide executive * * * capacity'' in that Act, nevertheless relied upon the above bulletin without inquiring further and, inconformity with this advice, failed to compensate his nonexempt foremen in accordance with the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act for work subject to that Act, performed before May 14, 1947. If the employer had inquired of the Administrator or had consulted the Code of Federal Regulations, he would have found that his foremen were not exempt. In a subsequent action brought by employees under section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the court may decide that the employer knew facts which ought to have put him as a reasonable man upon further inquiry, and, consequently, that he did not rely ``in good faith'' within the meaning of section 9, upon the bulletin published by the X Agency. \97\---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\97\ See statement of Representative Gwynne, 93 Cong. Rec. 1563, and colloquy between Senators Connally and Donnell, 93 Cong. Rec. 4453.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(d) Insofar as the period prior to May 14, 1947, is concerned, the employer may have received an interpretation from an agency which conflicted with an interpretation of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of which he was also aware. If the employer chose to reply upon the interpretation of the other agency, which interpretation worked to his advantage, considerable weight may well be given to the fact that the employer ignored the interpretation of the agency charged with the administration of the Fair Labor Standards Act and chose instead to rely upon the interpretation of an outside agency. \98\ Under these circumstances ``the question could properly be considered as to whether it was a good faith reliance or whether the employer was simply choosing a course which was most favorable to him.'' \99\ This problem will not arise in regard to any acts or omissions by the employer occurring on or after May 14, 1947, because section 10 provides that the employer, insofar as the Fair Labor Standards Act is concerned, may rely only upon regulations, orders, rulings, approvals, interpretations, administrative practices and enforcement policies of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division. \100\---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\98\ This view was expressed several times during the debates. See statements of Representative Keating, 93 Cong. Rec. 1512 and 4391; colloquy between Representatives Keating and Devitt, 93 Cong. Rec. 1515; statement of Representative Walter, 93 Cong. Rep. 4389; statement of Representative MacKinnon, 93 Cong. Rec. 4391; statement of Representative Gwynne, 93 Cong. Rec. 1563; statement of Senator Cooper, 93 Cong. Rec. 4451; colloquy between Senators Connally and Donnell, 93 Cong. Rec. 4452-4453.
\99\ Statement of Senator Cooper, 93 Cong. Rec. 4451. Representative Walter, a member of the Conference Committee, made the following explanatory statement to the House of Representatives (93 Cong. Rec. 4390): ``The defense of good faith is intended to apply only where an employer innocently and to his detriment, followed the law as it was laid down to him by Government agencies, without notice that such interpretations were claimed to be erroneous or invalid. It is not intended that this defense shall apply where an employer had knowledge of conflicting rules and chose to act in accordance with the one most favorable to him.'' Representative Gwynne made a similar statement (93 Cong. Rec. 1563).
\100\ Statement of Senator Wiley explaining Conference agreement to the Senate, 93 Cong. Rec. 4270; statement of Representative Walter, 93 Cong. Rec. 4389.--------------------------------------------------------------------------- Sec. 790.16 ``In reliance on.''
(a) In addition to acting (or omitting to act) in good faith and in conformity with an administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, interpretation, enforcement policy or practice, the employer must also prove that he actually relied upon it. \101\---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\101\ In a colloquy between Senators Thye and Cooper (93 Cong. Rec. 4451), Senator Cooper pointed out that the purpose of section 9 was to provide a defense for an employer who pleads and proves, among other things, that his failure to bring himself under the Act ``grew out of reliance upon'' the ruling of an agency. See also statement of Representative Keating, 93 Cong. Rec. 1512; colloquy between Representatives Keating and Devitt, 93 Cong. Rec. 1515; cf. colloquy between Senators Donnell and Ball, 93 Cong. Rec. 4372.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Assume, for example, that an employer failed to pay his employees in accordance with the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. After an employee suit has been brought against him, another employer calls his attention to a letter that had been written by the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, in which the opinion was expressed that employees of the type employed by the defendant were exempt from the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The defendant had no previous knowledge of this letter. In the pending employee suit, the court may decide that the opinion of the Administrator was erroneous and that the plaintiffs should have been paid in accordance with the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Since the employer had no knowledge of the administrator's interpretation at the time of his violations, his failure to comply with the overtime provisions could not have been ``in reliance on'' that interpretation; consequently, he has no defense under section 9 or section 10 of the Portal Act. Sec. 790.17 ``Administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval,or interpretation.''
(a) Administrative regulations, orders, rulings, approvals, and interpretations are all grouped together in sections 9 and 10, with no distinction being made in regard to their function under the ``good faith'' defense. Accordingly, no useful purpose would be served by an attempt to precisely define and distinguish each term from the others, especially since some of these terms are often employed interchangeably as having the same meaning.
(b) The terms ``regulation'' and ``order'' are variously used to connote the great variety of authoritative rules issued pursuant to statute by an administrative agency, which have the binding effect of law, unless set aside upon judicial review as arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. \102\---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\102\ See Final Report of Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Senate Document No. 8, 77th Cong. 1st sess. (1941) p. 27; 1 Vom Baur, Federal Administrative Law (1942) p. 486; sections 2(c), 2(d) and 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. section 1001.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c) The term ``interpretation'' has been used to describe a statement ``ordinarily of an advisory character, indicating merely the agency's present belief concerning the meaning of applicable statutory language.'' \103\ This would include bulletins, releases, and other statements issued by an agency which indicate its interpretation of the provisions of a statute.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\103\ Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Senate Document No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941), p. 27.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(d) The term ``ruling'' commonly refers to an interpretation made by an agency ``as a consequence of individual requests for rulings upon particular questions.'' \104\ Opinion letters of an agency expressing opinions as to the application of the law to particular facts presented by specific inquiries fall within this description.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\104\ Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee, page 27. To the same effect in 1 Vom Baur, Federal Administrative Law (1942), p. 492.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(e) The term ``approval'' includes the granting of licenses, permits, certificates or other forms of permission by an agency, pursuant to statutory authority. \105\---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\105\ See section 2(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. sec. 1001.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(f) The terms ``administrative regulation order, ruling, approval, or interpretation'' connote affirmative action on the part of an agency. \106\ A failure to act or a failure to reply to an inquiry on the part of an administrative agency is not a ``regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpretation'' within the meaning of sections 9 and 10. \107\ Thus, suppose that an employer writes a letter to the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, setting forth the facts concerning his business. He goes on to state in his letter that he believes his employees are not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act, and that unless he hears to the contrary from the Administrator, he will not pay them in accordance with its provisions. When the employer does not receive a reply to his letter within what he regards as a reasonable time, he assumes that the Administrator agrees with his (the employer's) interpretation of the Act and he acts accordingly. The employer's reliance under such circumstances is not a reliance upon an administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval or interpretation, within the meaning of sections 9 and 10.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\106\ See Final Report of Attorney General's Committee, p. 27; 1 Vom Baur, Federal Administrative Law, pp. 486, 492; Conference Report, p. 16; statements of Representative Walter, 93 Cong. Rec. 4389; statements of Representative Gwynne, 93 Cong. Rec. 1491; statements of Senator Donnell, 93 Cong. Rec. 2185; President's message of May 14, 1947, on approval of the Portal-to-Portal Act (93 Cong. Rec. 5281).
\107\ That this is true on and after the effective date of the Act is clear from the requirement in section 10 that the regulation, order, ruling, approval or interpretation relied on must be that of the Administrator in writing. As to section 9, the terms appear to have no different meaning.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(g) The affirmative action taken by the agency must be one which actually results in a ``regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpretation.'' If for example, the agency declines to express an opinion as to the application of the law in a particular fact situation, the agency is refraining from interpreting the law rather than giving an interpretation. \108\---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\108\ See Final Report of Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, p. 33.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(h) An employer does not have a defense under these two sections unless the regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpretation, upon which he relies, is in effect and operation at the time of his reliance. To the extent that it has been rescinded, modified, or determined by judicial authority to be invalid, it is no longer a ``regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpretation,'' and, consequently, an employer's subsequent reliance upon it offers him no defense under section 9 and 10. \109\ On the other hand, the last sentence in section 9 and in section 10 expressly provides that where the employer's good faith reliance on a regulation, order, ruling, approval or interpretation occurs before it is rescinded, modified, or determined by judicial authority to be invalid, his claim of a ``good faith'' defense for such earlier period is not defeated by the subsequent rescission or modification or by the subsequent determination of invalidity.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\109\ See House Report, p. 7, and statements of Representative Gwynne, 93 Cong. Rec. 1491, 1492, 1563. It will be noted that the provisions of section 12 of the Act, affording relief of employers who acted in conformity with the invalidated ``area of production'' regulations, would have been unnecessary if reliance could be placed on a regulation no longer in effect. See statement of Representative Gwynne, 93 Cong. Rec. 4388, and cf. remarks of Senator McCarran, discussing the bill before section 12 was added by the conference committee, 93 Cong. Rec. 2247.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(i) To illustrate these principles, assume that the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, in reply to an inquiry received from a particular employer, sends him a letter, in which the opinion is expressed that employees performing a particular type of work are not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act. The employer relied upon the Administrator's letter and did not pay his employees who were engaged in such work, in accordance with the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Several months later the Administrator issues a general statement, published in the Federal Register and given general distribution, that recent court decisions have persuaded him that the class of employees referred to above are within the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Accordingly, the statement continues, the Administrator hereby rescinds all his previous interpretations and rulings to the contrary. The employer who had received the Administrator's letter, not learning of the Administrator's subsequent published statement rescinding his contrary interpretations, continued to rely upon the Administrator's letter after the effective date of the published statement. Under these circumstances, the employer would, from the date he received the Administrator's letter to the effective date of the published statement rescinding the position expressed in the letter, have a defense under section 9 or 10, assuming he relied upon and conformed with that letter in good faith. However, in spite of the fact that this employer did not receive actual notice of the subsequent published statement, he has no defense for his reliance upon the letter during the period after the effective date of the public statement, because the letter, having been rescinded, was no longer an ``administrative * * * ruling * * * or interpretation'' within the meaning of sections 9 and 10. \110\---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\110\ See Final Report of Attorney General's Gwynne, 93 Cong. Rec. 1563; colloquy between Representative Gwynne and Lee Pressman, Hearings before House Subcommittee on the Judiciary, pp. 156-7.
The fact that an employer has no defense under section 9 or 10 of the Portal Act in the situation stated in the text would not, of course, preclude a court from finding that he acted in good faith having reasonable grounds to believe he was not in violation of the law. In such event, section 11 of the Act would permit the court to reduce or eliminate the employer's liability for liquidated damages in an employee suit. See Sec. 790.22.--------------------------------------------------------------------------- Sec. 790.18 ``Administrative practice or enforcement policy.''
(a) The terms ``administrative practice or enforcement policy'' refer to courses of conduct or policies which an agency has determined to follow \111\ in the administration and enforcement of a statute, either generally, or with respect to specific classes of situations. \112\ Administrative practices and enforcement policies may be set forth in statements addressed by the agency to the public. \113\ Although they may be, and frequently are, based upon decisions or views which the agency has set forth in its regulations, orders, rulings, approvals, or interpretations, nevertheless administrative practices and enforcement policies differ from these forms of agency action in that such practices or policies are not limited to matters concerned with the meaning or legal effect of the statutes administered by the agency and may be based wholly or in part on other considerations.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\111\ The agency may have determined to follow the course of conduct or policy for a limited time only (see paragraphs (c) and (f), this section) or for an indefinite time (see paragraph (b), this section), or for a period terminable by the happening of some contingency, such as a final decision in pending litigation.
\112\ See United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181 (1926); United States v. Boston & Maine R.R. Co., 279 U.S. 732 (1929); Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445 (1930); Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 308 U.S. 39 (1939). See also Final Report of Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, pp. 26-29; 1 Von Baur, Federal Administrative Law (1942), p. 474.
As to requirement that practice or policy be one with respect to a ``class of employers,'' see paragraph (g) of this section.
\113\ Pursuant to section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act, statements of general policy formulated and adopted by the agency for the guidance of the public are published in the Federal Register. An example is the statement of the Secretary of Labor and the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, dated June 16, 1947, published in 12 FR 3915.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) To illustrate this distinction, suppose the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division issues a general statement indicating that in his opinion a certain class of employees come within a specified exemption from provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act in any workweek when they do not engage in a substantial amount of nonexempt work. Such a statement is an ``interpretation'' within the meaning of sections 9 and 10 of the Portal Act. Assume that at the same time, the Administrator states that for purposes of enforcement, until further notice such an employee will be considered as engaged in a substantial amount of nonexempt work in any workweek when he spends in excess of a specified percentage of his time in such nonexempt work. This latter type of statement announces an ``administrative practice or enforcement policy'' within the meaning of sections 9 and 10 of the Portal Act.
(c) An administrative practice or enforcement policy may, under certain circumstances be at variance with the agency's current interpretation of the law. For example, suppose the Administrator announces that as a result of court decisions he has changed his view as to coverage of a certain class of employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act. However, he may at the same time announce that in order to give affected employers an opportunity to make the adjustments necessary for compliance with the changed interpretation, the Wage and Hour Division will not commence to enforce the Act on the basis of the new interpretation until the expiration of a specified period.
(d) In the statement of the managers on the part of the House, accompanying the report of the Conference Committee on the Portal-to-Portal Act, it is indicated (page 16) that under sections 9 and 10 ``an employer will be relieved from liability, in an action by an employee, because of reliance in good faith on an administrative practice or enforcement policy only (1) where such practice or policy was based on the ground that an act or omission was not a violation of the (Fair Labor Standards) Act, or (2) where a practice or policy of not enforcing the Act with respect to acts or omissions led the employer to believe in good faith that such acts or omissions were not violations of the Act.''
(e) The statement explaining the Conference Committee Report goes on to say, ``However, the employer will be relieved from criminal proceedings or injunctions brought by the United States, not only in the cases described in the preceding paragraph, but also where the practice or policy was such as to lead him in good faith to believe that he would not be proceeded against by the United States.''
(f) The statement explaining the Conference Committee Report gives the following illustrations of the above rules:
An employer will not be relieved from liability under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to his employees (in an action by them) for the period December 26, 1946, to March 1, 1947, if he is not exempt under the ``Area of Production'' regulations published in the Federal Register of December 25, 1946, notwithstanding the press release issued by the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, in which he stated that he would not enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 on account of acts or omissions occurring prior to March 1, 1947. On the other hand, he will, by reason of the enforcement policy set forth in such press releases, have a good defense to a criminal proceeding or injunction brought by the United States based on an act or omission prior to March 1, 1947.
(g) It is to be noted that, under the language of sections 9 and 10, an employer has a defense for good faith reliance on an administrative practice or an enforcement policy only when such practice or policy is ``with respect to the class of employers to which he belonged.'' \114\ Thus where an enforcement policy has been announced pertaining to laundries and linen-supply companies serving industrial or commercial establishments the operator of an establishment furnishing window-washing service to industrial and commercial concerns, who relied upon that policy in regard to his employees, has no defense under sections 9 and 10. The enforcement policy upon which he claimed reliance did not pertain to ``the class of employers to which he belonged.''---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\114\ This provision, which appeared for the first time in the conference bill, to which the term ``practice'' was restored after elimination by the Senate, was apparently designed to meet some of the objections which led to elimination of the word ``practice'' from the bill reported by the Senate judiciary Committee. Cf. remarks of Senator Murray, 93 Cong. Rec. 2238; remarks of Senator Johnston, 93 Cong. Rec. 2373; colloquy between Senators Lucas and Donnell, 93 Cong. Rec. 2185; remarks of Senator McGrath, 93 Cong. Rec. 2254-2256.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(h) Administrative practices and enforcement policies, similar to administrative regulations, orders, rulings, approvals and interpretations required affirmative action by an administrative agency. \115\ This should not be construed as meaning that an agency may not have administrative practices or policies to refrain from taking certain action as well as practices or policies contemplating positive acts of some kind. \116\ But before it can be determined that an agency actually has a practice or policy to refrain from acting, there must be evidence of its adoption by the agency through some affirmative action establishing it as the practice or policy of the agency. \117\ Suppose, for example, that shoe factories in a particular area were not investigated by Wage and Hour Division inspectors operating in the area. This fact would not establish the existence of a practice or policy of the Administrator to treat the employees of such establishments, for enforcement purposes, as not subject to the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, in the absence of proof of some affirmative action by the Administrator adopting such a practice or policy. A failure to inspect might be due to any one of a number of different reasons. It might, for instance, be due entirely to the fact that the inspectors' time was fully occupied in inspections of other industries in the area.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\115\ See Union Stockyards & Transit Co. v. United States, 308 U.S. 213, 223 (1939); and United States v. American Union Transport, Inc., 327 U.S. 437, 454 (1946). Cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Bunte Brothers, Inc., 312 U.S. 349, 351 (1941). See also President's message of May 14, 1947, 93 Cong. Rec. 5281.
\116\ See, for example, Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 349 (1933), where the Department of Agriculture announced ``its policy for the present is to leave the control (of Bang's disease) with the various States.'' See also in this connection the statement of June 23, 1947, by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary regarding the President's message of May 14, 1947, on the Portal-to-Portal Act, 93 Cong. Rec. 5281.
\117\ Union Stockyards & Transit Co. v. United States, supra. It may be noted in this connection that examples given by the sponsors of the legislation, in discussing the terms ``administrative practice or enforcement policy,'' involved situations in which affirmative action had been taken by the agency. Conference Report, p. 16; 93 Cong. Rec. 2185, 2198, 4389-4391.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(i) It was pointed out above that sections 9 and 10 do not offer a defense to the employer who relies upon a regulation, order, ruling, approval or interpretation which at the time of his reliance has been rescinded, modified or determined by judicial authority to be invalid. The same is true regarding administrative practices and enforcement policies. \118\ However, a plea of a ``good faith'' defense is not defeated by the fact that after the employer's reliance, the practice or policy is rescinded, modified, or declared invalid.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\118\ See Sec. 790.17 (h) and (i), and footnotes 111 and 112.--------------------------------------------------------------------------- Sec. 790.19 ``Agency of the United States.''
(a) In order to provide a defense under section 9 or section 10 of the Portal Act, the regulation, order, ruling, approval, interpretation, administrative practice or enforcement policy relied upon and conformed with must be that of an ``agency of the United States.'' Insofar as acts or omissions occurring on or after May 14, 1947 are concerned, it must be that of the ``agency of the United States specified in'' section 10(b), which, in the case of the Fair Labor Standards Act, is ``the Administrator of the Wage and House Division of the Department of Labor.'' However, with respect to acts or omissions occurring prior to May 14, 1947, section 9 of the Act permits the employer to show that he relied upon and conformed with a regulation, order, ruling, approval, interpretation, administrative practice or enforcement policy of ``any agency of the United States.'' \119\---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\119\ The differences in the provisions of the two sections are explained and illustrated in Sec. 790.13. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) The Portal Act contains no comprehensive definition of ``agency'' as used in sections 9 and 10, but an indication of the meaning intended by Congress may be found in section 10. In that section, where the ``agency'' whose regulation, order, ruling, approval, interpretation, administrative practice or enforcement policy may be relied on is confined to ``the agency of the United States'' specified in the section, the Act expressly limits the meaning of the term to the official or officials actually vested with final authority under the statutes involved. \120\ Similarly, the definitions of ``agency'' in other Federal statutes \121\ indicate that the term has customarily been restricted in its usage by Congress to the persons vested under the statutes with the real power to act for the Government--those who actually have the power to act as (rather than merely for) the highest administrative authority of the Government establishment. \122\ furthermore, it appears from the statement of the managers on the part of the House accompanying the Conference Committee Report, that the term ``agency'' as appearing in the Portal Act was employed in this sense. As there stated (p. 16), the regulations, orders, ruling, approvals, interpretations, administrative practices and enforcement policies relied upon and conformed with ``must be those of an `agency' and not of an individual officer or employee of the agency. Thus, if inspector A tells the employer that the agency interpretation is that the employer is not subject to the (Fair Labor Standards) Act, the employer is not relieved from liability, despite his reliance in good faith on such interpretations, unless it is in fact the interpretation of the agency.'' \123\ Similarly, the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, in explaining the conference agreement to the Senate, made the following statement concerning the ``good faith'' defense. ``It will be noted that the relief from liability must be based on a ruling of a Federal agency, and not a minor official thereof. I, therefore, feel that the legitimate interest of labor will be adequately protected under such a provision, since the agency will exercise due care in the issuance of any such ruling.'' \124\---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\120\ In regard to the Walsh-Healey Act, ``agency'' is defined in section 10 of the Portal-to-Portal Act as including, in addition to the Secretary of Labor, ``any Federal officer utilized by him in the administration of such Act.'' The legislative history of the Portal-to-Portal Act (93 Cong. Rec. 2239-2240) reveals that this clause was added because of the language in the Walsh-Healey Act authorizing the Secretary of Labor to administer the Act ``and to utilize such Federal officers and employees * * * as he may find necessary in the administration.''
\121\ Federal Register Act, 44 U.S.C. 304; Federal Reports Act, 5 U.S.C. 139; Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 1001.
\122\ See Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357 (1942); United States v. Watashe, 102 F. (2d) 428 (C.A. 10, 1939); 39 Opinions Attorney General 15 (1925). Cf. Keyser v. Hitz, 133 U.S. 138 (1890); 39 Opinions Attorney General 541 (1933); 13 George Washington Law Review 144 (1945).
\123\ See also statement by Representative Gwynne, 93 Cong. Rec. 1563; and statement by Senator Wiley explaining the conference agreement to the Senate, 93 Cong. Rec. 4270.
\124\ Statement of Senator Wiley, 93 Cong. Rec. 4270.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c) Accordingly, the defense provided by sections 9 and 10 of the Portal Act is restricted to those situations where the employer can show that the regulation, order, ruling, approval, interpretation, administrative practice or enforcement policy with which he conformed and on which he relied in good faith was actually that of the authority vested with power to issue or adopt regulations, orders, rulings, approvals, interpretations, administrative practices or enforcement policies of a final nature as the official act or policy of the agency. \125\ Statements made by other officials or employees are not regulations, orders, rulings, approvals, interpretations, administrative practices or enforcement policies of the agency within the meaning of sections 9 and 10.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\125\ Statement by Representative Gwynne, 93 Cong. Rec. 1563; statements by Representative Walter, 93 Cong. Rec. 1496-1497, 4389; statement by Representative Robsion, 93 Cong. Rec. 1500; statement by Senator Thye, 93 Cong. Rec. 4452. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Restrictions and Limitations on Employee Suits