The heads of DoD Components shall assure that personnel security program matters are included in their administrative inspection programs.
Sec. Appendix A to Part 154--Investigative Scope
This appendix prescribes the scope of the various types of personnel security investigations.
1. National Agency Check (NAC). Components of a NAC. At a minimum, the first three of the described agencies (DCII, FBI/HQ, and FBI/ID) below shall be included in each complete NAC; however, a NAC may also include a check of any or all of the other described agencies, if appropriate.
a. DCII records consist of an alphabetical index of personal names and impersonal titles that appear as subjects or incidentals in investigative documents held by the criminal, counterintelligence, fraud, and personnel security investigative activities of the three military departments, DIS, Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), and the National Security Agency. DCII records will be checked on all subjects of DoD investigations.
b. FBI/HQ has on file copies of investigations conducted by the FBI. The FBI/HQ check, included in every NAC, consists of a review of files for information of a security nature and that developed during applicant-type investigations.
c. An FBI/ID check, included in every NAC (but not ENTNAC), is based upon a technical fingerprint search that consists of a classification of the subject's fingerprints and comparison with fingerprint cards submitted by law enforcement activities. If the fingerprint card is not classifiable, a ``name check only'' of these files is automatically conducted.
d. OPM. The files of OPM contain the results of investigations conducted by OPM under Executive Orders 9835 and 10450, those requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Department of Energy (DOE) and those requested since August 1952 to serve as a basis for ``Q'' clearances. Prior to that date, ``Q'' clearance investigations were conducted by the FBI. A ``Q'' clearance is granted to individuals who require access to DOE information. In order to receive a ``Q'' clearance, a full field background investigation must be completed on the individual requiring access in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Also on file are the results of investigations on the operation of the Merit System, violations of the Veterans Preference Act, appeals of various types, fraud and collusion in Civil Service examinations and related matters, data on all Federal employment, and an index of all BIs on civilian employees or applicants completed by agencies of the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government. The OPM files may also contain information relative to U.S. citizens who are, or who were, employed by a United Nations organization or other public international organization such as the Organization of American States. OPM records are checked on all persons who are, or who have been, civilian employees of the U.S. Government; or U.S. citizens who are, or who have been, employed by a United Nations organization or other public international organization; and on those who have been granted security clearances by the NRC or DOE.
e. Immigration and Naturalization Service (I&NS;). The files of I&NS; contain (or show where filed) naturalization certificates, certificates of derivative citizenship, all military certificates of naturalization, repatriation files, petitions for naturalization and declaration of intention, visitors' visas, and records of aliens (including government officials and representatives of international organizations) admitted temporarily into the U.S. I&NS; records are checked when the subject is:
(1) An alien in the U.S., or
(2) A naturalized citizen whose naturalization has not been verified, or
(3) An immigrant alien, or
(4) A U.S. citizen who receives derivative citizenship through the naturalization of one or both parents, provided that such citizenship has not been verified in a prior investigation.
f. State Department. The State Department maintains the following records:
(1) Security Division (S/D) files contain information pertinent to matters of security, violations of security, personnel investigations pertinent to that agency, and correspondence files from 1950 to date. These files are checked on all former State Department employees.
(2) Passport Division (P/D) shall be checked if subject indicates U.S. citizenship due to birth in a foreign country of American parents. This is a check of State Department Embassy files to determine if subject's birth was registered at the U.S. Embassy in the country where he was born. Verification of this registration is verification of citizenship.
g. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The files of CIA contain information on present and former employees, including members of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), applicants for employment, foreign nationals, including immigrant aliens in the U.S., and U.S. citizens traveling outside the U.S. after July 1, 1946. These files shall be checked under the following guidelines. ------------------------------------------------------------------------
Investigation Criteria for CIA Checks------------------------------------------------------------------------NAC, DNACI or ENTNAC................ Residence anywhere outside of the
U.S. for a year or more since age
18 except under the auspices of
the U.S. Government; and, travel,
education, residence, or
employment since age 18 in any
designated country (Appendix G).BI.................................. Same as NAC, DNACI, and ENTNAC
requirements plus travel,
residence, employment, and
education outside the U.S. for
more than a continuous 3-month
period during the past 5 years,
or since age 18, except when
under the auspices of the
Government.SBI................................. Same as BI requirements except the
period of the investigation will
cover the past 15 years, or since
age 18. Also when subject's
employment, education or
residence has occurred overseas
for a period of more than one
year under the auspices of the
U.S. Government, such checks will
be made.------------------------------------------------------------------------
These files shall also be checked if subject has been an employee of CIA or when other sources indicate that CIA may have pertinent information.
h. Military Personnel Record Center files are maintained by separate departments of the Armed Forces, General Services Administration and the Reserve Records Centers. They consist of the Master Personnel Records of retired, separated, reserve, and active duty members of the Armed Force. These records shall be checked when the requester provides required identifying data indicating service during the last 15 years.
i. Treasury Department. The files of Treasury Department agencies (Secret Service, Internal Revenue Service, and Bureau of Customs) will be checked only when available information indicates that an agency of the Treasury Department may be reasonably expected to have pertinent information.
j. The files of other agencies such as the National Guard Bureau, the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO), etc., will be checked when pertinent to the purpose for which the investigation is being conducted.
2. DoD National Agency Check plus Written Inquires (DNACI):
a. Scope: The time period covered by the DNACI is limited to the most recent five (5) years, or since the 18th birthday, whichever is shorter, provided that the investigation covers at least the last two (2) full years of the subject's life, although it may be extended to the period necessary to resolve any questionable or derogatory information. No investigation will be conducted prior to an individual's 16th birthday. All DNACI investigation information will be entered on the DD Form 398-2 and FD-Form 258 and forwarded to the Defense Investigative Service (paragraph D, Appendix B).
b. Components of a DNACI:
(1) NAC. This is the same as described in paragraph 1, above.
(2) Credit. (a) A credit bureau check will be conducted to cover the 50 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, at all locations where subject has resided (including duty stations and home ports), been employed, or attended school for 6 months (cumulative) during the past five (5) years.
(b) When information developed reflects unfavorably upon a person's current credit reputation or financial responsibility, the investigation will be expanded as necessary.
(3) Employment--(a) Non-Federal Employment. (1) Verify, via written inquiry, all employment within the period of investigation with a duration of six (6) months or more. Current employment will be checked regardless of duration.
(2) If all previous employments have been less than 6 months long, the most recent employment, in addition to the current, will be checked in all cases.
(3) Seasonal holiday, part-time and temporary employment need not be checked unless subparagraph 2 above applies.
(b) Federal employment. All Federal employment (to include military assignments) within the period of investigation will be verified by the requester through locally available records, and a statement reflecting that such checks have been favorably accomplished will be contained in the investigative request. Those that cannot be verified in this fashion will be accomplished via written inquiry by DIS (within the 50 United States, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands).
3. Background Investigation (BI). The period of investigation for the BI is 5 years and applies to military, civilian, and contractor personnel.
a. NAC. See paragraph 1, above.
b. Local Agency Checks (LAC). Same as paragraph 4j, below, except period of coverage is five years.
c. Credit checks. Same as paragraph 4i, below.
d. SUBJECT Interview (SI). This is the principal component of a BI. In some instances an issue will arise after the primary SI and a secondary interview will be conducted. Interviews in the latter category are normally ``issue'' interviews that will be reported in the standard BI narrative format.
e. Employment records. Employment records will be checked at all places where employment references are interviewed with the exception of current Federal employment when the requester indicates that such employment has been verified with favorable results.
f. Employment reference coverage. A minimum of three references, either supervisors or co-workers, who have knowledge of the SUBJECT's activities in the work environment will be interviewed. At least one employment reference at the current place of employment will always be interviewed with the exception of an individual attending military basic training, or other military training schools lasting less than 90 days. However, if the SUBJECT has only been at the current employment for less than 6 months, it will be necessary to go not only to his or her current employment (for example, for one employment reference) but also to the preceding employment of at least 6 months for additional employment references. If the SUBJECT has not had prior employment of at least 6 months, interview(s) will be conducted at the most recent short-term employment in addition to the current employment.
g. Developed and Listed Character References. A minimum of three developed character references (DCR) whose combined association with the SUBJECT covers the entire period of investigation will be interviewed. If coverage cannot be obtained through the DCRs, listed character reference (LCR) will be contacted to obtain coverage.
h. Unfavorable information. Unfavorable information developed in the field will be expanded.
4. Special Background Investigation (SBI)--a. Components of an SBI. The period of investigation for an SBI is the last 15 years or since the 18th birthday, whichever is the shorter period, provided that the investigation covers at least the last 2 full years of the subject's life. No investigation will be conducted for the period prior to an individual's 16th birthday. Emphasis shall be placed on peer coverage whenever interviews are held with personal sources in making education, employment, and reference (including developed) contact.
b. NAC. In addition to conducting a NAC on the subject of the investigation, the following additional requirements apply.
(1) A DCII, FBI/ID name check only and FBI/HQ check shall be conducted on subject's current spouse or cohabitant. In addition, such other national agency checks as deemed appropriate based on information on the subject's SPH or PSQ shall be conducted.
(2) A check of FBI/HQ files on members of subject's immediate family who are aliens in the U.S. or immigrant aliens who are 18 years of age or older shall be conducted. As used throughout the part, members of subject's immediate family include the following:
(a) Current spouse.
(b) Adult children, 18 years of age or older, by birth, adoption, or marriage.
(c) Natural, adopted, foster, or stepparents.
(d) Guardians.
(e) Brothers and sisters either by birth, adoption, or remarriage of either parent.
(3) The files of CIA shall be reviewed on alien members of subject's immediate family who are 18 years of age or older, regardless of whether or not these persons reside in the U.S.
(4) I&NS; files on members of subject's immediate family 18 years of age or older shall be reviewed when they are:
(a) Aliens in the U.S., or
(b) Naturalized U.S. citizens whose naturalization has not been verified in a prior investigation, or
(c) Immigrant aliens, or
(d) U.S. citizens born in a foreign country of American parent(s) or U.S. citizens who received derivative citizenship through the naturalization of one or both parents, provided that such citizenship has not been verified in a prior investigation.
c. Birth. Verify subject's date and place of birth (DPOB) through education, employment and/or other records. Verify through Bureau of Vital Statistics (BVS) records if not otherwise verified under d., below, or if a variance is developed.
d. Citizenship. Subject's citizenship status must be verified in all cases. U.S. citizens who are subjects of investigation will be required to produce documentation that will confirm their citizenship. Normally such documentation should be presented to the DoD Component concerned prior to the initiation of the request for investigation. When such documentation is not readily available, investigative action may be initiated with the understanding that the designated authority in the DoD Component will be provided with the documentation prior to the issuance of a clearance. DIS will not check the BVS for native-born U.S. citizens except as indicated in 4.c. above. In the case of foreign-born U.S. citizens, DIS will check I&NS; records. The citizenship status of all foreign-born members of subject's immediate family shall be verified. Additionally, when the investigation indicates that a member of subject's immediate family has not obtained U.S. citizenship after having been eligible for a considerable period of time, an attempt should be made to determine the reason. The documents listed below are acceptable for proof of U.S. citizenship for personnel security determination purposes:
(1) A birth certificate must be presented if the individual was born in the United States. To be acceptable, the certificate must show that the birth record was filed shortly after birth and must be certified with the registrar's signature and the raised, impressed, or multicolored seal of his office except for States or jurisdictions which, as a matter of policy, do not issue certificates with a raised or impressed seal. Uncertified copies of birth certificates are not acceptable.
(a) A delayed birth certificate (a record filed more than one year after the date of birth) is acceptable provided that it shows that the report of birth was supported by acceptable secondary evidence of birth as described in subparagraph (b), below.
(b) If such primary evidence is not obtainable, a notice from the registrar stating that no birth record exists should be submitted. The notice shall be accompanied by the best combination of secondary evidence obtainable. Such evidence may include a baptismal certificate, a certificate of circumcision, a hospital birth record, affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts of the birth, or other documentary evidence such as early census, school, or family bible records, newspaper files and insurance papers. Secondary evidence should have been created as close to the time of birth as possible.
(c) All documents submitted as evidence of birth in the United States shall be original or certified documents. Uncertified copies are not acceptable.
(2) A certificate of naturalization shall be submitted if the individual claims citizenship by naturalization.
(3) A certificate of citizenship issued by the I&NS; shall be submitted if citizenship was acquired by birth abroad to a U.S. citizen parent or parents.
(4) A Report of Birth Abroad of A Citizen of The United States of America (Form FS-240), a Certification of Birth (Form FS-545 or DS-1350), or a Certificate of Citizenship is acceptable if citizenship was acquired by birth abroad to a U.S. citizen parent or parents.
(5) A passport or one in which the individual was included will be accepted as proof of citizenship.
(1) Verify graduation or attendance at institutions of higher learning in the U.S. within the last 15 years, if such attendance was not verified during a prior investigation.
(2) Attempts will be made to review records at overseas educational institutions when the subject resided overseas in excess of one year.
(3) Verify attendance or graduation at the last secondary school attended within the past 10 years if there was no attendance at an institution of higher learning within the period of investigation.
(4) Verification of attendance at military academies is only required when the subject failed to graduate.
(1) Non-Federal employment. Verify all employment within the period of investigation to include seasonal, holiday, Christmas, part-time, and temporary employment. Interview one supervisor and one co-worker at subject's current place of employment as well as at each prior place of employment during the past 10 years of six months duration or longer. The interview requirement for supervisors and co-workers does not apply to seasonal, holiday, Christmas, part-time, and temporary employment (4 months or less) unless there are unfavorable issues to resolve or the letter of inquiry provides insufficient information.
(2) Federal employment. All Federal employment will be verified within the period of investigation to include Christmas, seasonal temporary, summer hire, part-time, and holiday employment. Do not verify Federal employment through review of records if already verified by the requester. If Federal employment has not been verified by the requester, then subject's personnel file at his/her current place of employment will be reviewed. All previous Federal employment will be verified during this review. In the case of former Federal employees, records shall be examined at the Federal Records Center in St. Louis, Missouri. Interview one supervisor and one co-worker at all places of employment during the past 10 years if so employed for 6 months or more.
(3) Military employment. Military service for the last 15 years shall be verified. The subject's duty station, for the purpose of interview coverage, is considered as a place of employment. One supervisor and one co-worker shall be interviewed at subject's current duty station if subject has been stationed there for 6 months or more; additionally, a supervisor and a co-worker at subject's prior duty stations where assigned for 6 months or more during the past 10 years shall be interviewed.
(4) Unemployment. Subject's activities during all periods of unemployment in excess of 30 consecutive days, within the period of investigation, that are not otherwise accounted for shall be verified.
(5) When an individual has resided outside the U.S. continuously for over one year, attempts will be made to confirm overseas employments as well as conduct required interviews of a supervisor and co-worker.
g. References. Three developed character references who have sufficient knowledge of subject to comment on his background, suitability, and loyalty shall be interviewed personally. Efforts shall be made to interview developed references whose combined association with subject covers the full period of the investigation with particular emphasis on the last 5 years. Employment, education, and neighborhood references, in addition to the required ones, may be used as developed references provided that they have personal knowledge concerning the individual's character, discretion, and loyalty. Listed character references will be interviewed only when developed references are not available or when it is necessary to identify and locate additional developed character references or when it is necessary to verify subject's activities (e.g., unemployment).
h. Neighborhood investigation. Conduct a neighborhood investigation to verify each of subject's residences in the U.S. of a period of 6 months or more on a cumulative basis, during the past 5 years or during the period of investigation, whichever is shorter. During each neighborhood investigation, interview two neighbors who can verify subject's period of residence in that area and who were sufficiently acquainted to comment on subject's suitability for a position of trust. Neighborhood investigations will be expanded beyond this 5-year period only when there is unfavorable information to resolve in the investigation.
i. Credit. Conduct credit bureau check in the 50 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and overseas (where APO/FPO addresses are provided) at all places where subject has resided (including duty stations and home ports), been employed, or attended school for 6 months or more, on a cumulative basis, during the last 7 years or during the period of the investigation, whichever is shorter. When coverage by a credit bureau is not available, credit references located in that area will be interviewed. Financial responsibility, including unexplained affluence, will be stressed in all reference interviews.
j. Local Agency Checks (LAC's). LACs, including State central criminal history record repositories, will be conducted on subject at all places of residence to include duty stations and/or home ports, in the 50 States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, where residence occurred during the past 15 years or during the period of investigation, whichever is shorter. If subject's place of employment and/or education is serviced by a different law enforcement agency than that servicing the area of residence, LACs shall be conducted also in these areas.
k. Foreign travel. If subject has been employed, educated, traveled or resided outside of the U.S. for more than 90 days during the period of investigation, except under the auspices of the U.S. Government, additional record checks during the NAC shall be made in accordance with paragraph 1.f. of this Appendix. In addition, the following requirements apply:
(1) Foreign travel not under the auspices of the U.S. Government. When employment, education, or residence has occurred overseas for more than 90 days during the past 15 years or since age 18, which was not under the auspices of the U.S. Government, a check of records will be made at the Passport Office of the Department of State, the CIA, and other appropriate agencies. Efforts shall be made to develop sources, generally in the U.S., who knew the individual overseas to cover significant employment, education, or residence and to determine whether any lasting foreign contacts or connections were established during this period. If the individual has worked or lived outside of the U.S. continuously for over one year, the investigation will be expanded to cover fully this period through the use of such investigative assets and checks of record sources as may be available to the U.S. Government in the foreign country in which the individual resided.
(2) Foreign travel under the auspices of the U.S. Government. When employment, education, or residence has occurred overseas for a period of more than one year, under the auspices of the U.S. Government, a record check will be made at the Passport Office of the Department of State, the CIA and other appropriate agencies. Efforts shall be made to develop sources (generally in the U.S.) who knew the individual overseas to cover significant employment, education, or residence and to determine whether any lasting foreign contacts or connections were established during this period. Additionally, the investigation will be expanded to cover fully this period through the use of such investigative assets and checks of record sources as may be available to the U.S. Government in the foreign country in which the individual resided.
1. Foreign connections. All foreign connections (friends, relatives, and/or business connections) of subject and immediate family in the U.S. or abroad, except where such association was the direct result of subject's official duties with the U.S. Government, shall be ascertained. Investigation shall be directed toward determining the significance of foreign connections on the part of subject and the immediate family, particularly where the association is or has been with persons whose origin was within a country whose national interests are inimical to those of the U.S. When subject or his spouse has close relatives residing in a Communist-controlled country, or subject has resided, visited, or traveled in such a country, not under U.S. Government auspices, the provisions of Sec. 154.8(i)(3) of this part apply.
m. Organizations. Efforts will be made during reference interviews and record reviews to determine if subject and/or the immediate family has, or formerly had, membership in, affiliation with, sympathetic association towards, or participated in any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons of the type described in Sec. 154.7(a) through (d) of this part.
n. Divorce. Divorces, annulments, and legal separations of subject shall be verified only when there is reason to believe that the grounds for the action could reflect on subject's suitability for a position of trust.
o. Military service. All military service and types of discharge during the last 15 years shall be verified.
p. Medical records. Medical records shall not be reviewed unless:
(1) The requester indicates that subject's medical records were unavailable for review prior to submitting the request for investigation, or
(2) The requester indicates that unfavorable information is contained in subject's medical records, or
(3) The subject lists one or more of the following on the SPH or PSQ:
(a) A history of mental or nervous disorders.
(b) That subject is now or has been addicted to the use of habit-forming drugs such as narcotics or barbiturates or is now or has been a chronic user to excess of alcoholic beverages.
q. Updating a previous investigation to SBI standards. If a previous investigation does not substantially meet the minimum standards of an SBI or if it is more than 5 years old, a current investigation is required but may be limited to that necessary to bring the individual's file up to date in accordance with the investigative requirements of an SBI. Should new information be developed during the current investigation that bears unfavorably upon the individual's activities covered by the previous investigation, the current inquiries shall be expanded as necessary to develop full details of this new information.
5. Periodic Reinvestigation (PR). a. Each DoD military, civilian, consultant and contractor employee (to include non-U.S. citizens (foreign nationals and/or immigrant aliens) holding a limited access authorization) occupying a critical sensitive position, possessing a TOP SECRET clearance, or occupying a special access program position shall be the subject of a PR initiated 5 years from the date of completion of the last investigation. The PR shall cover the period of the last 5 years.
b. Minimum investigative requirements. A PR shall include the following minimum scope.
(1) NAC. A valid NAC on the SUBJECT will be conducted in all cases. Additionally, for positions requiring SCI access, checks of DCII, FBI/HQ, FBI/ID name check only, and other agencies deemed appropriate, will be conducted on the SUBJECT's current spouse or cohabitant, if not previously conducted. Additionally, NACs will be conducted on immediate family members, 18 years of age or older, who are aliens and/or immigrant aliens, if not previously accomplished.
(2) Credit. Credit bureau checks covering all places where the SUBJECT resided for 6 months or more, on a cumulative basis, during the period of investigation, in the 50 States, District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and overseas (where APO/FPO addresses are provided), will be conducted.
(3) Subject interview. The interview should cover the entire period of time since the last investigation, not just the last 5-year period. Significant information disclosed during the interview, which has been satisfactorily covered during a previous investigation, need not be explored again unless additional relevant information warrants further coverage. An SI is not required if one of the following conditions exists:
(a) The SUBJECT is aboard a deployed ship or in some remote area that would cause the interview to be excessively delayed.
(b) The SUBJECT is in an overseas location serviced by the State Department or the FBI.
(4) Employment. Current employment will be verified. Military and Federal service records will not routinely be checked, if previously checked by the requester when PR was originally submitted. Also, employment records will be checked wherever employment interviews are conducted. Records need be checked only when they are locally available, unless unfavorable information has been detected.
(5) Employment references. Two supervisors or co-workers at the most recent place of employment or duty station of 6 months; if the current employment is less than 6 months employment reference interviews will be conducted at the next prior place of employment, which was at least a 6-month duration.
(6) Developed Character References (DCRs). Two developed character references who are knowledgeable of the SUBJECT will be interviewed. Developed character references who were previously interviewed will only be reinterviewed when other developed references are not available.
(7) Local Agency Checks (LACs). DIS will conduct local agency checks on the SUBJECT at all places of residence, employment, and education during the period of investigation, regardless of duration, including overseas locations.
(8) Neighborhood Investigation. Conduct a neighborhood investigation to verify subjects' current residence in the United States. Two neighbors who can verify subject's period of residence in that area and who are sufficiently acquainted to comment on the subject's suitability for a position of trust will be interviewed. Neighborhood investigations will be expanded beyond the current residence when unfavorable information arises.
(9) Ex-spouse interview. If the subject of investigation is divorced, the ex-spouse will be interviewed when the date of final divorce action is within the period of investigation.
(10) Select scoping. When the facts of the case warrant, additional select scoping will be accomplished, as necessary, to fully develop or resolve an issue. [52 FR 11219, Apr. 8, 1987, as amended at 58 FR 61026, Nov. 19, 1993]
Sec. Appendix B to Part 154--Request Procedures
A. General. To conserve investigative resources and to insure that personnel security investigations are limited to those essential to current operations and are clearly authorized by DoD policies, organizations requesting investigations must assure that continuing command attention is given to the investigative request process.
In this connection, it is particularly important that the provision of Executive Order 12356 requiring strict limitations on the dissemination of official information and material be closely adhered to and that investigations requested for issuing clearances are limited to those instances in which an individual has a clear need for access to classified information. Similarly, investigations required to determine eligibility for appointment or retention in DoD, in either a civilian or military capacity, must not be requested in frequency or scope exceeding that provided for in this part.
In view of the foregoing, the following guidelines have been developed to simplify and facilitate the investigative request process:
1. Limit requests for investigation to those that are essential to current operations and clearly authorized by DoD policies and attempt to utilize individuals who, under the provisions of this part, have already met the security standard;
2. Assure that military personnel on whom investigative requests are initiated will have sufficient time remaining in service after completion of the investigation to warrant conducting it;
3. Insure that request forms and prescribed documentation are properly executed in accordance with instructions;
4. Dispatch the request directly to the DIS Personnel Investigations Center;
5. Promptly notify the DIS Personnel Investigations Center if the investigation is no longer needed (notify OPM if a NACI is no longer needed); and
6. Limit access through strict need-to-know, thereby requiring fewer investigations.
In summary, close observance of the above-cited guidelines will allow the DIS to operate more efficiently and permit more effective, timely, and responsive service in accomplishing investigations.
B. National Agency Check (NAC). When a NAC is requested an original only of the DD Form 398-2 (National Agency Check Request) and a completed FD 258 (Applicant Fingerprint Card) are required. If the request is for an ENTNANC, an original only of the DD Form 398-2 and a completed DD Form 2280 (Armed Forces Fingerprint Card) are required. Those forms should be sent directly to: Personnel Investigation Center, Defense Investigative Service, P.O. Box 1083, Baltimore, Maryland 21203.
C. National Agency Check plus written Inquiries (NACI). When a NACI is requested, an original and one copy of the SF 85 (Data for Nonsensitive or Noncritical-sensitive Position), an SF 171 (Personal Qualifications Statement), and an SF 87 (U.S. Civil Service Commission Fingerprint Chart) shall be sent directly to: Office of Personnel Management, Bureau of Personnel Investigations, NACI Center, Boyers, Pennsylvania 16018.
The notation ``ALL REFERENCES'' shall be stamped immediately above the title at the top of the Standard Form 85.
D. DoD National Agency Check with Inquiries (DNACI). 1. When a DNACI is requested, one copy of DD Form 1879, an original and two copies of the DD Form 398-2 (National Agency Check Request), two copies of FD 258 (Fingerprint Card), and an original of DD Form 2221 (Authority for Release of Information and Records) shall be sent directly to: Personnel Investigations Center, Defense Investigative Service, P.O. Box 1083, Baltimore, Maryland 21203.
2. The DD Form 398-2 must be completed to cover the most recent five year period. All information, to include items relative to residences and employment, must be complete and accurate to avoid delays in processing.
E. Special Background Investigation (SBI)/Background Investigation (BI). 1. When requesting a BI or SBI, one copy of DD Form 1879 (Request for Personnel Security Investigation), an original and four copies of DD Form 398 (Statement of Personnel History), two copies of FD 258, and an original of DD Form 2221 (Authority for Release of Information and Records) shall be sent directly to the: Personnel Investigations Center, Defense Investigative Service, P.O. Box 454, Baltimore, Maryland 21203.
2. For the BI and SBI, the DD Form 398 must be completed to cover the most recent five and 15 year period, respectively, or since the 18th birthday, whichever is shorter.
F. Periodic Reinvestigation (PR). 1. PRs shall be requested only in such cases as are authorized by Sec. 154.19 (a) through (k) of this part.
a. For a PR requested in accordance with Sec. 154.19 (a) and (k) and the DD Form 1879 must be accompanied by the following documents:
(1) Original and four copies of DD Form 398.
(2) Two copies of FD-258.
(3) Original copy of DD Form 2221.
b. In processing PRs, previous investigative reports will not be requested by the requesting organization, unless significant derogatory or adverse information, postdating the most recent favorable adjudication, is developed during the course of reviewing other locally available records. In the latter instance, requests for previous investigative reports may only be made if it is determined by the requesting organization that the derogatory information is so significant that a review of previous investigative reports is necessary for current adjudicative determinations.
2. No abbreviated version of DD Form 398 may be submitted in connection with a PR.
3. The PR request shall be sent to the address in paragraph E.1.
G. Additional investigation to resolve derogatory or adverse information. 1. Requests for additional investigation required to resolve derogatory or adverse information shall be submitted by DD Form 1879 (Request for Personnel Security Investigation) to the: Defense Investigative Service, P.O. Box 454, Baltimore, Maryland 21203.
Such requests shall set forth the basis for the additional investigation and describe the specific matter to be substantiated or disproved.
2. The request should be accompanied by an original and four copies of the DD Form 398, where appropriate, two copies of FD-258 and an original copy of DD Form 2221, unless such documentation was submitted within the last 12 months to DIS as part of a NAC or other personnel security investigation. If pertinent, the results of a recently completed NAC, NACI, or other related investigative reports available should also accompany the request.
H. Obtaining results of prior investigations. Requesters requiring verification of a specified type of personnel security investigation, and/or requiring copies of prior investigations conducted by the DIS shall submit requests by letter or message to: Defense Investigative Service Investigative Files Division, P.O. Box 1211, Baltimore, Maryland 21203, Message Address: DIS PIC BALTIMORE MD/ /D0640.
The request will include subject's name, grade, social security number, date and place of birth, and DIS case control number if known.
I. Requesting postadjudication cases. 1. Requests pertaining to issues arising after adjudication of an investigation (postadjudication cases) shall be addressed to DIS on a DD Form 1879 accompanied by a DD Form 398, where appropriate.
2. All requests for initial investigations will be submitted to PIC regardless of their urgency. If, however, there is an urgent need for a postadjudication investigation, or the mailing of a request to PIC for initiation of a postadjudication case would prejudice timely pursuit of investigative action, the DD Form 1879 may be directed for initiation, in CONUS, to the nearest DIS Field Office, and in overseas locations, to the military investigative service element supporting the requester (Appendix I). The field element (either DIS or the military investigative agency) will subsequently forward either the DD Form 1879 or completed investigation to PIC.
3. A fully executed DD Form 1879 and appropriate supporting documents may not be immediately available. Further, a case that is based on sensitive security issues may be compromised by a request that the subject submit a DD Form 398. A brief explanation should appear on DD Form 1879s which does not include complete supporting documentation.
J. Requests involving contractor employees. To preclude duplicative investigative requests and double handling of contractor employee cases involving access to classified information, all requests for investigation of contractor personnel must be submitted, using authorized industrial security clearance forms, for processing through the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, except for programs in which specific approval has been obtained from the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to utilize other procedures.
K. Responsibility for proper documentation of requests. The official signing the request for investigation shall be responsible for insuring that all documentation is completed in accordance with these instructions.
Appendix C to Part 154--Tables for Requesting Investigations
Guide for Requesting Background Investigations (BI) (Table 1)----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A B C----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------If the individual is a: And duties require:.......... Then a BI is required before:----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. national military member, Top Secret clearance......... Granting final clearance.
civilian, consultant, or contractor
employee.U.S. national civilian employee...... Assignment to a ``Critical'' Assignment to the position.
sensitive position.U.S. national military member, DoD Occupying a ``critical'' Occupying a ``critical'' position.
civilian or contractor employee. position in the Nuclear
Weapon Personnel Reliability
Program (PRP).U.S. national military member or Granting, denying clearances. Performing clearance functions.
civilian employee.U.S. national military member or Membership on security Appointment to the board.
civilian employee. screening, hearing, or
review board.Immigrant alien...................... Limited access to Secret or Issuing limited access authorization (Note
Confidential information. 1).
Non-U.S. national employee excluding Limited access to Secret or Issuing limited access authorization.
immigrant alien. Confidential information.Non-U.S. national nominee military Education and orientation for Before performing duties.
education and orientation program of military personnel.
(from a country listed at Appendix
G).U.S. national military member DoD Assignment to a category two Assignment.
civilian or contractor employee. Presidential Support
position.U.S. national military member, DoD Access to NATO COSMIC Access may be granted.
civilian or contractor employee information.
assigned to NATO.Note 1: BI will cover a 10 year scope.
Guide for Requesting Special Background Investigations (SBI) (Table 2)----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A B C----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------If the individual is a: And duties require:.......... Then a SBI is required before:----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. national military member, DoD Access to SCI................ Granting Access.
civilian, consultant, or contractor Assisgnment to a category one Assignment.
employee. Presidential Support
position.
Access to SIOP-ESI........... Granting access.
Assignment to the National Assignment.
Security Agency.
Access to other Special Granting access.
Access programs approved
under Sec. 154.17(g).
Assignment to personnel Assignment.
security,
counterintelligence, or
criminal investigative or
direct investigative support
duties.
Guide for Requesting Periodic Reinvestigations (PR) (Table 3)----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A B C----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------If the individual is a: And duties require:.......... Then a PR is required before:----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. national military member, DoD Access to SCI................ 5 years from date of last SBI/BI or PR.
civilian, consultant, or contractor Top Secret Clearance........ 5 years from date of last SBI/BI or PR.
employee.
Access to NATO COSMIC........ 5 years from date of last SBI/BI or PR.
Assignment to Presidential 5 years from date of last SBI/BI or PR.
Support activities.U.S. national civilian employee...... Assignment to a ``Critical'' 5 years from last SBI/BI or PR.
sensitive position.Non-U.S. national employee........... Current limited access 5 years from last SBI/BI or PR.
authorization to Secret or
Confidential information.
Guide for Requesting DOD National Agency Check With Inquiries (DNACI) or NACI (Table 4)----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A B C----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------If the individual is a: And duties require:.......... Then DNACI/NACI is required----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------U.S. national military member or Secret clearance............. Before granting clearance (note 1).
contractor. ............................. May be automatically issued (note 2).
Interim Secret Clearance.....U.S. national civilian employee or Secret clearance............. Before granting clearance.
consultant. Interim Secret Clearance..... May be automatically issued (note 3).
Appointment to ``Non Before appointment.
Critical'' sensitive
position.U.S. national military member, DoD Occupying a ``controlled'' Before assignment.
civilian or contractor employee. position in the Nuclear
Weapon PRR.
Applicant for appointment as a Commission in the Award Before appointment (after appointment for
commissioned officer. Forces. health professionals, chaplains, and
attorneys, under conditions authorized by
Sec. 154.15(d) of this part).Naval Academy Midshipman, Military Enrollment................... To be initiated 90 days after entry.
Academy Cadet, or Air Force Academy
Cadet.Reserve Officer Training Corps Cadet Entry to advanced course or Then a DNACI is required to be initiated
of Midshipman. College Scholarship Program. 90 days after entry.Note 1: First term enlistees shall require an ENTNAC.Note 2: Provided DD Form 398-2 is favorably reviewed, local records check favorably accomplished, and DNACI
initiated.Note 3: Provided an authority designated in Appendix E finds delay in such appointment would be harmful to
national security; favorable review of DD Form 398-2; NACI initiated; favorable local records check
accomplished. Table 5.
Guide for Requesting National Agency Checks (NAC) (Table 5)----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A B C----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------If the individual is a: And duties require:.......... Then a NAC is required:----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------A first-term enlistee................ Retention in the Armed Forces To be initiated NLT three work days after
(including National Guard entry (note 1).
and Reserve).Prior service member reentering Retention in the Armed Forces To be initiated NLT three work days after
military service after break in (including National Guard reentry.
Federal employment exceeding 1 year. and Reserve).Nominee for military education and Education and orientation of Before performing duties (note 2).
orientation program. military personnel.U.S. national military, DoD civilian, Access to restricted areas, Before authorizing entry.
or contractor employee. sensitive information, or
equipment as defined in Sec.
154.18(b).Nonappropriated fund instrumentality Appointment as NAFI custodian Before appointment.
(NAFI) civilian employee. Accountability for non Before completion of probationary period.
appropriated funds.
Fiscal responsibility as Before completion of probationary period.
determined by NAFI custodian.
Other ``positions of trust''. Before appointment.Persons requiring access to chemical Access to or security of Before assignment.
agents. chemical agents.U.S. national, civilian employee Wavier under provisions of Before appointment (note 3).
nominee for customs inspection Sec. 154.18(d).
duties.Red Cross/United States Organization Assignment with the Armed Before assignment (See note 4 for foreign
personnel. Forces overseas. national personnel).U.S. national........................ DoD building pass............ Prior to issuance.Foreign national employed overseas... No access to classified Prior to employment (note 4).
information.Note 1: Request ENTNAC only.Note 2: Except where personnel whose country of origin is a country listed at Appendix G, a BI will be required
(See Sec. 154.18(1)).Note 3: A NAC not over 5 years old suffices unless there has been a break in employment over 12 months. Then a
current NAC is required.Note 4: In such cases, the NAC shall consist of: (a) Host government law enforcement and security agency record
checks at the city, state (province), and national level, and (b) DCII.
Sec. Appendix D to Part 154--Reporting of Nonderogatory Cases
Background Investigation (BI) and Special Background Investigation (SBI) shall be considered as devoid of significant adverse information unless they contain information listed below:
1. Incidents, infractions, offenses, charges, citations, arrests, suspicion or allegations of illegal use or abuse of drugs or alcohol, theft or dishonesty, unreliability, irresponsibility, immaturity, instability or recklessness, the use of force, violence or weapons or actions that indicate disregard for the law due to multiplicity of minor infractions.
2. All indications of moral turpitude, heterosexual promiscuity, aberrant, deviant, or bizarre sexual conduct or behavior, transvestitism, transsexualism, indecent exposure, rape, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, child molestation, wife-swapping, window-peeping, and similar situations from whatever source. Unlisted full-time employment or education; full-time education or employment that cannot be verified by any reference or record source or that contains indications of falsified education or employment experience. Records or testimony of employment, education, or military service where the individual was involved in serious offenses or incidents that would reflect adversely on the honesty, reliability, trustworthiness, or stability of the individual.
3. Foreign travel, education, visits, correspondence, relatives, or contact with persons from or living in a foreign country or foreign intelligence service.
4. Mental, nervous, emotional, psychological, psychiatric, or character disorders/behavior or treatment reported or alleged from any source.
5. Excessive indebtedness, bad checks, financial difficulties or irresponsibility, unexplained affluence, bankruptcy, or evidence of living beyond the individual's means.
6. Any other significant information relating to the criteria included in paragraphs (a) through (q) of Sec. 154.7 or Appendix H of this part. [52 FR 11219, Apr. 8, 1987, as amended at 58 FR 61026, Nov. 19, 1993]
Sec. Appendix E to Part 154--Personnel Security Determination
Authorities
A. Officials authorized to grant, deny or revoke personnel security clearances (Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential):1. Secretary of Defense and/or designee2. Secretary of the Army and/or designee3. Secretary of the Navy and/or designee4. Secretary of the Air Force and/or designee5. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and/or designee6. Directors of the Defense Agencies and/or designee7. Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands and/or designee
B. Officials authorized to grant Limited Access Authorizations: 1. Secretaries of the Military Departments and/or designee2. Director, Washington Headquarters Service for OSD and/or designee3. Chairman, JCS and/or designee4. Directors of the Defense Agencies and/or designee5. Commanders, Unified and Specified Commands and/or designee
C. Officials authorized to grant access to SCI: Director, NSA--for NSADirector, DIA--for OSD, OJCS, and Defense AgenciesSenior Officers of the Intelligence Community of the Army, Navy, and Air Force--for their respective Military Departments, or their single designee.
D. Officials authorized to certify personnel under their jurisdiction for access to Restricted Data (to include Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information): see enclosure to DoD Directive 5210.2.
E. Officials authorized to approve personnel for assignment to Presidential Support activities: The Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense or designee.
F. Officials authorized to grant access to SIOP-ESI: 1. Director of Strategic Target Planning2. Director, Joint Staff, OJCS3. Chief of Staff, U.S. Army4. Chief of Naval Operations5. Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force6. Commandant of the Marine Corps7. Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands8. The authority to grant access delegated above may be further delegated in writing by the above officials to the appropriate subordinates.
G. Officials authorized to designate sensitive positions:
1. Heads of DoD Components or their designees for critical-sensitive positions.
2. Organizational commanders for noncritical-sensitive positions.
H. Nonappropriated Fund Positions of Trust:
Officials authorized to designate nonappropriated fund positions of trust: Heads of DoD Components and/or their designees.
Sec. Appendix F to Part 154--Guidelines for Conducting Prenomination
Personal Interviews
A. Purpose. The purpose of the personal interview is to assist in determining the acceptability of an individual for nomination and further processing for a position requiring an SBI.
B. Scope. Questions asked during the course of a personal interview must have a relevance to a security determination. Care must be taken not to inject improper matters into the personal interview. For example, religious beliefs and affiliations, beliefs and opinions regarding racial matters, political beliefs and affiliations of a nonsubversive nature, opinions regarding the constitutionality of legislative policies, and affiliations with labor unions and fraternal organizations are not proper subjects for inquiry. Department of Defense representatives conducting personal interviews should always be prepared to explain the relevance of their inquiries. Adverse inferences shall not be drawn from the refusal of a person to answer questions the relevance of which has not been established.
C. The interviewer. Except as prescribed in paragraph B. above, persons conducting personal interviews normally will have broad latitude in performing this essential and important function and, therefore, a high premium must necessarily be placed upon the exercise of good judgment and common sense. To insure that personal interviews are conducted in a manner that does not violate lawful civil and private rights or discourage lawful political activity in any of its forms, or intimidate free expression, it is necessary that interviewers have a keen and well-developed awareness of and respect for the rights of interviewees. Interviewers shall never offer an opinion as to the relevance or significance of information provided by the interviewee to eligibility for access to SCI. If explanation in this regard is required, the interviewer will indicate that the sole function of the interview is to obtain information and that the determination of relevance or significance to the individual's eligibility will be made by other designated officials.
D. Interview procedures. 1. The Head of the DoD Component concerned shall establish uniform procedures for conducting the interview that are designed to elicit information relevant to making a determination of whether the interviewee, on the basis of the interview and other locally available information (DD 398, Personnel Security Investigation Questionnaire, personnel records, security file, etc.), is considered acceptable for nomination and further processing.
2. Such procedures shall be structured to insure the interviewee his full rights under the Constitution of the United States, the Privacy Act of 1974 and other applicable statutes and regulations.
E. Protection of interview results. All information developed during the course of the interview shall be maintained in personnel security channels and made available only to those authorities who have a need-to-know in connection with the processing of an individual's nomination for duties requiring access to SCI or those who need access to information either to conduct the required SBI or to adjudicate the matter of the interviewee's eligibility for access to SCI, or as otherwise authorized by Executive order or statute.
F. Acceptability determination. 1. The determination of the interviewee's acceptability for nomination for duties requiring access to sensitive information shall be made by the commander, or designee, of the DoD organization that is considering nominating the interviewee for such duties.
2. Criteria guidelines contained in DCID 1/14 upon which the acceptability for nomination determination is to be based shall be provided to commanders of DoD organizations who may nominate individuals for access to SCI and shall be consistent with those established by the Senior Officer of the Intelligence Community of the Component concerned with respect to acceptability for nomination to duties requiring access to SCI.
Sec. Appendix G to Part 154 [Reserved]
Sec. Appendix H to Part 154--Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining
Eligibility for Access to Classified Information
1. Introduction. The following adjudicative guidelines are established for all U.S. Government civilian and military personnel, consultants, contractors, employees of contractors, licensees, certificate holders or grantees and their employees, and other individuals who require access to classified information. They apply to persons being considered for initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information, to include sensitive compartmented information and special access programs, and are to be used by government departments and agencies in all final clearance determinations. Government departments and agencies may also choose to apply these guidelines to analogous situations regarding persons being considered for access to other types of protected information.
Decisions regarding eligibility for access to classified information take into account factors that could cause a conflict of interest and place a person in the position of having to choose between his or her commitments to the United States, including the commitment to protect classified information, and any other compelling loyalty. Accesses decisions also take into account a person's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. No coercive policing could replace the self-discipline and integrity of the person entrusted with the nation's secrets as the most effective means of protecting them. When a person's life history shows evidence of unreliability or untrustworthiness, questions arise whether the person can be relied on and trusted to exercise the responsibility necessary for working in a secure environment where protecting classified information is paramount.
2. The adjudicative process.
(a) The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient period of a person's life to make an affirmative determination that the person is an acceptable security risk. Eligibility for access to classified information is predicated upon the individual meeting these personnel security guidelines. The adjudication process is the careful weighing of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. Available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in reaching a determination. In evaluating the relevance of an individual's conduct, the adjudicator should consider the following factors:
(1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;
(2) The circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation;
(3) The frequency and recency of the conduct;
(4) The individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct;
(5) The extent to which participation is voluntary;
(6) The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes;
(7) The motivation for the conduct;
(8) The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and
(9) The likelihood of continuation or recurrence;
(b) Each case must be judged on its own merits, and final determination remains the responsibility of the specific department or agency. Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.
(c) The ability to develop specific thresholds for action under these guidelines is limited by the nature and complexity of human behavior. The ultimate determination of whether the granting or continuing of eligibility for a security clearance is clearly consistent with the interests of national security must be an overall common sense judgment based upon careful consideration of the following guidelines, each of which is to be evaluated in the context of the whole person.
(1) GUIDELINE A: Allegiance to the United States;
(2) GUIDELINE B: Foreign Influence;
(3) GUIDELINE C: Foreign Preference;
(4) GUIDELINE D: Sexual Behavior;
(5) GUIDELINE E: Personal Conduct;
(6) GUIDELINE F: Financial Considerations;
(7) GUIDELINE G: Alcohol Consumption;
(8) GUIDELINE H: Drug Involvement;
(9) GUIDELINE I: Psychological Conditions;
(10) GUIDELINE J: Criminal Conduct;
(11) GUIDELINE K: Handling Protected Information;
(12) GUIDELINE L: Outside Activities;
(13) GUIDELINE M: Use of Information Technology Systems
(d) Although adverse information concerning a single criterion may not be sufficient for an unfavorable determination, the individual may be disqualified if available information reflects a recent or recurring pattern of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or emotionally unstable behavior. Notwithstanding the whole-person concept, pursuit of further investigation may be terminated by an appropriate adjudicative agency in the face of reliable, significant, disqualifying, adverse information.
(e) When information of security concern becomes known about an individual who is currently eligible for access to classified information, the adjudicator should consider whether the person:
(1) Voluntarily reported the information;
(2) Was truthful and complete in responding to questions;
(3) Sought assistance and followed professional guidance, where appropriate;
(4) Resolved or appears likely to favorably resolve the security concern;
(5) Has demonstrated positive changes in behavior and employment;
(6) Should have his or her access temporarily suspended pending final adjudication of the information.
(f) If after evaluating information of security concern, the adjudicator decides that the information is not serious enough to warrant a recommendation of disapproval or revocation of the security clearance, it may be appropriate to recommend approval with a warning that future incidents of a similar nature may result in revocation of access.
Guideline A: Allegiance To The United States
3. The concern. An individual must be of unquestioned allegiance to the United States. The willingness to safeguard classified information is in doubt if there is any reason to suspect an individual's allegiance to the United States.
4. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(a) Involvement in, support of, training to commit, or advocacy of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, or sedition against the United States of America;
(b) Association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to commit, or who are committing, any of the above acts;
(c) Association or sympathy with persons or organizations that advocate, threaten, or use force or violence, or use any other illegal or unconstitutional means, in an effort to:
(1) Overthrow or influence the government of the United States or any state or local government;
(2) Prevent Federal, state, or local government personnel from performing their official duties;
(3) Gain retribution for perceived wrongs caused by the Federal, state, or local government;
(4) Prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state.
5. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) The individual was unaware of the unlawful aims of the individual or organization and severed ties upon learning of these;
(b) The individual's involvement was only with the lawful or humanitarian aspects of such an organization;
(c) Involvement in the above activities occurred for only a short period of time and was attributable to curiosity or academic interest;
(d) The involvement or association with such activities occurred under such unusual circumstances, or so much time has elapsed, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or loyalty.
Guideline B: Foreign Influence
6. The concern. Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.
7. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(a) Contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
(b) Connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information;
(c) Counterintelligence information, that may be classified, indicates that the individual's access to protected information may involve unacceptable risk to national security;
(d) Sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
(e) A substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation;
(f) Failure to report, when required, association with a foreign national;
(g) Unauthorized association with a suspected or known agent, associate, or employee of a foreign intelligence service;
(h) Indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign country are acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual to possible future exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
(i) Conduct, especially while traveling outside the U.S., which may make the individual vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or coercion by a foreign person, group, government, or country.
8. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) The nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.;
(b) There is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest;
(c) Contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation;
(d) The foreign contacts and activities are on U.S. Government business or are approved by the cognizant security authority;
(e) The individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons, groups, or organizations from a foreign country;
(f) The value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual.
Guideline C: Foreign Preference
9. The concern. When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.
10. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(a) Exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family member. This includes but is not limited to:
(1) Possession of a current foreign passport;
(2) Military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign country;
(3) Accepting educational, medical, retirement, social welfare, or other such benefits from a foreign country;
(4) Residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship requirements;
(5) Using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business interests in another country;
(6) Seeking or holding political office in a foreign country;
(7) Voting in a foreign election;
(b) Action to acquire or obtain recognition of a foreign citizenship by an American citizen;
(c) Performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of a foreign person, group, organization, or government in conflict with the national security interest;
(d) Any statement or action that shows allegiance to a country other than the United States: for example, declaration of intent to renounce United States citizenship; renunciation of United States citizenship.
11. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) Dual citizenship is based solely on parents' citizenship or birth in a foreign country;
(b) The individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship;
(c) Exercise of the rights, privileges, or obligations of foreign citizenship occurred before the individual became a U.S. citizen or when the individual was a minor;
(d) Use of a foreign passport is approved by the cognizant security authority.
(e) The passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security authority, or otherwise invalidated;
(f) The vote in a foreign election was encouraged by the United States Government.
Guideline D: Sexual Behavior
12. The concern. Sexual behavior that involves a criminal offense indicates a personality or emotional disorder, reflects lack of judgment or discretion, or which may subject the individual to undue influence or coercion, exploitation, or duress can raise questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. No adverse inference concerning the standards in this Guideline may be raised solely on the basis of the sexual orientation of the individual.
13. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(a) Sexual behavior of a criminal nature, whether or not the individual has been prosecuted;
(b) A pattern of compulsive, self-destructive, or high risk sexual behavior that the person is unable to stop or that may be symptomatic of a personality disorder;
(c) Sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or duress;
(d) Sexual behavior of a public nature and/or that reflects lack of discretion or judgment.
14. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) The behavior occurred prior to or during adolescence and there is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature;
(b) The sexual behavior happened so long ago, so infrequently, or under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(c) The behavior no longer serves as a basis for coercion, exploitation, or duress.
(d) The sexual behavior is strictly private, consensual, and discreet.
Guideline E: Personal Conduct
15. The concern. Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.
The following will normally result in an unfavorable clearance action or administrative termination of further processing for clearance eligibility:
(a) Refusal, or failure without reasonable cause, to undergo or cooperate with security processing, including but not limited to meeting with a security investigator for subject interview, completing security forms or releases, and cooperation with medical or psychological evaluation;
(b) Refusal to provide full, frank and truthful answers to lawful questions of investigators, security officials, or other official representatives in connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination.
16. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(a) Deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities;
(b) Deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security official, competent medical authority, or other official government representative;
(c) Credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not properly safeguard protected information;
(d) Credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse determination, but which, when combined with all available information supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not properly safeguard protected information. This includes but is not limited to consideration of:
(1) Untrustworthy or unreliable behavior to include breach of client confidentiality, release of proprietary information, unauthorized release of sensitive corporate or other government protected information:
(2) Disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior in the workplace;
(3) A pattern of dishonesty or rule violations;
(4) Evidence of significant misuse of Government or other employer's time or resources;
(e) Personal conduct or concealment of information about one's conduct that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress, such as:
(1) Engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person's personal, professional, or community standing, or
(2) While in another country, engaging in any activity that is illegal in that country or that is legal in that country but illegal in the United States and may serve as a basis for exploitation or pressure by the foreign security or intelligence service or other group;
(f) violation of a written or recorded commitment made by the individual to the employer as a condition of employment;
(g) association with persons involved in criminal activity.
17. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) The individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts;
(b) The refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or concealment was caused or significantly contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of authorized personnel or legal counsel advising or instructing the individual specifically concerning the security clearance process. Upon being made aware of the requirement to cooperate or provide the information, the individual cooperated fully and truthfully.
(c) The offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(d) The individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur;
(e) The individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress;
(f) The information was unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable reliability;
(g) Association with persons involved in criminal activity has ceased or occurs under circumstances that do not cast doubt upon the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, judgment, or willingness to comply with rules and regulations.
Guideline F: Financial Considerations
18. The concern. Failure or inability to live within one's means, satisfy debts, and meet financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. An individual who is financially overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. Compulsive gambling is a concern as it may lead to financial crimes including espionage. Affluence that cannot be explained by known sources of income is also a security concern. It may indicate proceeds from financially profitable criminal acts.
19. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(a) Inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts;
(b) Indebtedness caused by frivolous or irresponsible spending and the absence of any evidence of willingness or intent to pay the debt or establish a realistic plan to pay the debt.
(c) A history of not meeting financial obligations;
(d) Deceptive or illegal financial practices such as embezzlement, employee theft, check fraud, income tax evasion, expense account fraud, filing deceptive loan statements, and other intentional financial breaches of trust;
(e) Consistent spending beyond one's means, which may be indicated by excessive indebtedness, significant negative cash flow, high debt-to-income ratio, and/or other financial analysis;
(f) Financial problems that are linked to drug abuse, alcoholism, gambling problems, or other issues of security concern;
(g) Failure to file annual Federal, state, or local income tax returns as required or the fraudulent filing of the same;
(h) Unexplained affluence, as shown by a lifestyle or standard of living, increase in net worth, or money transfers that cannot be explained by subject's known legal sources of income;
(i) Compulsive or addictive gambling as indicated by an unsuccessful attempt to stop gambling, ``chasing losses'' (i.e. increasing the bets or returning another day in an effort to get even), concealment of gambling losses, borrowing money to fund gambling or pay gambling debts, family conflict or other problems caused by gambling.
20. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) The behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(b) The conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person's control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or separation), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances;
(c) The person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem and/or there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control;
(d) The individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts;
(e) The individual has a reasonable basis to dispute the legitimacy of the past-due debt which is the cause of the problem and provides documented proof to substantiate the basis of the dispute or provides evidence of actions to resolve the issue;
(f) The affluence resulted from a legal source of income.
Guideline G: Alcohol Consumption
21. The concern. Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment or the failure to control impulses, and can raise questions about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness.
22. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(a) Alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving while under the influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, disturbing the peace, or other incidents of concern, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent;
(b) Alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for work or duty in an intoxicated or impaired condition, or drinking on the job, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent;
(c) Habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of impaired judgment, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent;
(d) Diagnosis by a duly qualified medical professional (e.g., physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence;
(e) Evaluation of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence by a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol treatment program;
(f) Relapse after diagnosis of alcohol abuse or dependence and completion of an alcohol rehabilitation program;
(g) Failure to follow any court order regarding alcohol education, evaluation, treatment, or abstinence.
23. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) So much time has passed, or the behavior was so infrequent, or it happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(b) The individual acknowledges his or her alcoholism or issues of alcohol abuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence (if alcohol dependent) or responsible use (if an alcohol abuser);
(c) The individual is a current employee who is participating in a counseling or treatment program, has no history of previous treatment and relapse, and is making satisfactory progress;
(d) The individual has successfully completed inpatient or outpatient counseling or rehabilitation along with any required aftercare, has demonstrated a clear and established pattern of modified consumption or abstinence in accordance with treatment recommendations, such as participation in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar organization and has received a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified medical professional or a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol treatment program.
Guideline H: Drug Involvement
24. The concern. Use of an illegal drug or misuse of a prescription drug can raise questions about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness, both because it may impair judgment and because it raises questions about a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations.
(a) Drugs are defined as mood and behavior altering substances, and include:
(1) Drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds identified and listed in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, as amended (e.g., marijuana or cannabis, depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and hallucinogens), and
(2) Inhalants and other similar substances;
(b) Drug abuse is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug in a manner that deviates from approved medical direction.
25. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(a) Any drug abuse (see above definition); \1\---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 986 any person who is an unlawful user of, or is addicted to, a controlled substance as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802), may not be granted or have renewed their access to classified information.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Testing positive for illegal drug use;
(c) Illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution; or possession of drug paraphernalia;
(d) Diagnosis by a duly qualified medical professional (e.g., physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of drug abuse or drug dependence;
(e) Evaluation of drug abuse or drug dependence by a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized drug treatment program;
(f) Failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program prescribed by a duly qualified medical professional;
(g) Any illegal drug use after being granted a security clearance;
(h) Expressed intent to continue illegal drug use, or failure to clearly and convincingly commit to discontinue drug use.
26. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) The behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(b) A demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future, such as:
(1) Disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts;
(2) Changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used;
(3) An appropriate period of abstinence;
(4) A signed statement of intent with automatic revocation of clearance for any violation;
(c) Abuse of prescription drugs was after a severe or prolonged illness during which these drugs were prescribed, and abuse has since ended;
(d) Satisfactory completion of a prescribed drug treatment program, including but not limited to rehabilitation and aftercare requirements, without recurrence of abuse, and a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified medical professional.
Guideline I: Psychological Conditions
27. The concern. Certain emotional, mental, and personality conditions can impair judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness. A formal diagnosis of a disorder is not required for there to be a concern under this guideline. A duly qualified mental health professional (e.g., clinical psychologist or psychiatrist) employed by, or acceptable to and approved by the U.S. Government, should be consulted when evaluating potentially disqualifying and mitigating information under this guideline. No negative inference concerning the standards in this Guideline may be raised solely on the basis of seeking mental health counseling.
28. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(a) Behavior that casts doubt on an individual's judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness that is not covered under any other guideline, including but not limited to emotionally unstable, irresponsible, dysfunctional, violent, paranoid, or bizarre behavior;
(b) An opinion by a duly qualified mental health professional that the individual has a condition not covered under any other guideline that may impair judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness; \2\---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 986, any person who is mentally incompetent, as determined by a credentialed mental health professional approved by the Department of Defense, may not be granted or have renewed their access to classified information.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c) The individual has failed to follow treatment advice related to a diagnosed emotional, mental, or personality condition, e.g., failure to take prescribed medication.
29. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) The identified condition is readily controllable with treatment, and the individual has demonstrated ongoing and consistent compliance with the treatment plan;
(b) The individual has voluntarily entered a counseling or treatment program for a condition that is amenable to treatment, and the individual is currently receiving counseling or treatment with a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified mental health professional;
(c) Recent opinion by a duly qualified mental health professional employed by, or acceptable to and approved by the U.S. Government that an individual's previous condition is under control or in remission, and has a low probability of recurrence or exacerbation;
(d) The past emotional instability was a temporary condition (e.g., one caused by death, illness, or marital breakup), the situation has been resolved, and the individual no longer shows indications of emotional instability;
(e) There is no indication of a current problem.
Guideline J: Criminal Conduct
30. The concern. Criminal activity creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. By its very nature, it calls into question a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules and regulations.
31. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(a) A single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses;
(b) Discharge or dismissal from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions; \3\---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 986, a person who has received a dishonorable discharge or has been dismissed from the Armed Forces may not be granted or have renewed access to classified information. In a meritorious case, the Secretaries of the Military Departments or designee; or the Directors of WHS, DIA, NSA, DOHA or designee may authorize a waiver of this prohibition.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c) Allegation or admission of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the person was formally charged, formally prosecuted or convicted;
(d) Individual is currently on parole or probation;
(e) Violation of parole or probation, or failure to complete a court-mandated rehabilitation program;
(f) Conviction in a Federal or State court, including a court-martial of a crime, sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding one year and incarcerated as a result of that sentence for not less than a year.\4\---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Under the above mentioned statute, a person who has been convicted in a Federal or State court, including courts martial, sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding one year and incarcerated for not less than one year, may not be granted or have renewed access to classified information. The same waiver provision also applies.---------------------------------------------------------------------------
32. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) So much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior happened, or it happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(b) The person was pressured or coerced into committing the act and those pressures are no longer present in the person's life;
(c) Evidence that the person did not commit the offense;
(d) There is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including but not limited to the passage of time without recurrence of criminal activity, remorse or restitution, job training or higher education, good employment record, or constructive community involvement;
(e) Potentially disqualifying conditions 31. (b) and (f) may not be mitigated unless, where meritorious circumstances exist, the Secretaries of the Military Departments or designee; or the Directors of Washington Headquarters Services (WHS), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) or designee has granted a waiver.
Guideline K: Handling Protected Information
33. The concern. Deliberate or negligent failure to comply with rules and regulations for protecting classified or other sensitive information raises doubt about an individual's trustworthiness, judgment, reliability, or willingness and ability to safeguard such information, and is a serious security concern.
34. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(a) Deliberate or negligent disclosure of classified or other protected information to unauthorized persons, including but not limited to personal or business contacts, to the media, or to persons present at seminars, meetings, or conferences;
(b) Collecting or storing classified or other protected information at home or in any other unauthorized location;
(c) Loading, drafting, editing, modifying, storing, transmitting, or otherwise handling classified reports, data, or other information on any unapproved equipment including but not limited to any typewriter, word processor, or computer hardware, software, drive, system, gameboard, handheld, ``palm'' or pocket device or other adjunct equipment;
(d) Inappropriate efforts to obtain or view classified or other protected information outside one's need to know;
(e) Copying classified or other protected information in a manner designed to conceal or remove classification or other document control markings;
(f) Viewing or downloading information from a secure system when the information is beyond the individual's need-to-know;
(g) Any failure to comply with rules for the protection of classified or other sensitive information;
(h) Negligence or lax security habits that persist despite counseling by management.
(i) Failure to comply with rules or regulations that results in damage to the National Security, regardless of whether it was deliberate or negligent.
35. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) So much time has elapsed since the behavior, or it has happened so infrequently or under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(b) The individual responded favorably to counseling or remedial security training and now demonstrates a positive attitude toward the discharge of security responsibilities;
(c) The security violations were due to improper or inadequate training.
Guideline L: Outside Activities
36. The concern. Involvement in certain types of outside employment or activities is of security concern if it poses a conflict of interest with an individual's security responsibilities and could create an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
37. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(a) Any employment or service, whether compensated or volunteer, with:
(1) The government of a foreign country;
(2) Any foreign national, organization, or other entity;
(3) A representative of any foreign interest;
(4) Any foreign, domestic, or international organization or person engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology;
(b) Failure to report or fully disclose an outside activity when this is required.
38. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) Evaluation of the outside employment or activity by the appropriate security or counterintelligence office indicates that it does not pose a conflict with an individual's security responsibilities or with the national security interests of the United States;
(b) The individual terminated the employment or discontinued the activity upon being notified that it was in conflict with his or her security responsibilities.
Guideline M: Use of Information Technology Systems
39. The concern. Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations pertaining to information technology systems may raise security concerns about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness, calling into question the willingness or ability to properly protect sensitive systems, networks, and information. Information Technology Systems include all related computer hardware, software, firmware, and data used for the communication, transmission, processing, manipulation, storage, or protection of information.
40. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(a) Illegal or unauthorized entry into any information technology system or component thereof;
(b) Illegal or unauthorized modification, destruction, manipulation or denial of access to information, software, firmware, or hardware in an information technology system;
(c) Use of any information technology system to gain unauthorized access to another system or to a compartmented area within the same system;
(d) Downloading, storing, or transmitting classified information on or to any unauthorized software, hardware, or information technology system;
(e) Unauthorized use of a government or other information technology system;
(f) Introduction, removal, or duplication of hardware, firmware, software, or media to or from any information technology system without authorization, when prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations;
(g) Negligence or lax security habits in handling information technology that persist despite counseling by management;
(h) Any misuse of information technology, whether deliberate or negligent, that results in damage to the national security.
41. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) So much time has elapsed since the behavior happened, or it happened under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(b) The misuse was minor and done only in the interest of organizational efficiency and effectiveness, such as letting another person use one's password or computer when no other timely alternative was readily available;
(c) The conduct was unintentional or inadvertent and was followed by a prompt, good-faith effort to correct the situation and by notification of supervisor. [71 FR 51475, Aug. 30, 2006]
Sec. Appendix I to Part 154--Overseas Investigations
1. Purpose
The purpose of this appendix is to establish, within the framework of this part, 32 CFR part 361 and Defense Investigative Service Manual 20-1, standardized procedures for the military investigative agencies to follow when they perform administrative and investigative functions on behalf of DIS at overseas locations.
2. Type Investigation
This part describes in detail Background Investigations (BI) which are conducted for Limited Access Authorizations and those Special Investigative Inquiries conducted for post-adjudicative purposes. Hereafter they are referred to as LAA and Post-adjudicative cases and are briefly described in paragraphs a and b below:
a. Limited access authorization. A level of access to classified defense information that may be granted to a non-U.S. citizen under certain conditions, one of which is that a BI must have been completed with satisfactory results. Sec. 154.16(d) further describes LAA cases.
b. Post-adjudication investigation. A Personnel Security Investigation (PSI) predicated on new, adverse or questionable security, suitability or hostage information that arises and requires the application of investigation procedures subsequent to adjudicative action on a DoD-affiliated person's eligibility for continued access to classified information, assignment to or retention in sensitive duties or other designated duties requiring such investigation. While these cases are normally predicated on the surfacing of unfavorable information subsequent to favorable adjudication, they may also be opened when favorable information is offered to counter a previous unfavorable adjudication. Sec. 154.9(c)(3) further describes these cases.
3. General
a. As a rule, investigative activity in most PSIs occurs in the U.S. even when the Subject is at an overseas location. Therefore, the submission of requests for investigation to the Personnel Investigation Center (PIC) at Baltimore is a required procedure as it ensures uniform application of DoD PSI policy and the efficient dispatch and coordination of leads.
b. When the purpose of the investigation is for an LAA or post-adjudication on a Subject overseas, much, if not all of the leads are at an overseas location. While these cases also may be submitted directly to PIC for action, there is an inherent delay in the mailing of the request, the exchange of leads and reports with PIC, and transmittal of the reports back to the requester. To avoid this delay, the military investigative agencies, when acting for DIS overseas in accordance with 32 CFR part 361 may, with their Headquarters approval, accept these requests for investigations, initiate them and disseminate the results from the same level as they open, close, and disseminate their own cases. Usually this will greatly improve response time to the requester.
c. Under the procedures in paragraph b., above, DIS will not often be in a position to directly exercise its responsibility for control and direction until the case or lead is in progress or even completed; therefore, adherence to the policy stated in referenced documents, and as modified herein, is mandatory. When the policy of the military investigative agency is at variance with the above, the matter will be referred to the respective headquarters for resolution.
d. Since DIS is ultimately responsible for the personnel security product, it must be kept informed of all such matters referred to in this appendix. For instance, when the investigative agency overseas receives a DD Form 1879, Request for Personnel Security Investigation, which sets forth an issue outside DIS jurisdiction, it will reject the request, inform the requester of the reason and furnish an information copy of the DD Form 1879 and rejection letter to PIC. When the issue/jurisdiction is unclear to the investigative agency, the DD Form 1879 and the perceived jurisdictional question should be promptly forwarded to DIS for action and, if appropriate, to the component's headquarters for information. Questions on the interpretation of DIS or DoD policy and Directives pertaining to individual PSI cases can usually be resolved through direct communications with PIC.
e. 32 CFR part 361 establishes the supporting relationship of the military investigative agencies to DIS in overseas areas, and DIS provides these agencies with copies of relevant policy and interpretive guidance. For these reasons, the investigative agency vice the requester, is responsible for evaluating the request, processing it, collecting and evaluating the results within their jurisdiction for sufficiency, and forwarding the completed product to the appropriate activity.
f. The magnitude of operations at PIC requires that methods of handling LAA and post-adjudicative cases be consistent to the maximum extent possible. For this reason, the procedures for LAA cases are nearly identical to those for post-adjudicative cases. Briefly, the main exceptions are:
(1) The notification to PIC that a post-adjudication case has been opened will be by message, since an issue is present at the outset, whereas notification of an LAA case should normally be by mail.
(2) The scope of the LAA investigation is 10 years or since the person's 18th birthday, whichever is shortest, whereas the leads in a post-djudication case are limited to resolving the issue.
4. Jurisdiction
a. As set-forth in 32 CFR part 361 DIS is responsible for conducting all DoD PSIs in the 50 States, District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, and will request the military departments to accomplish investigative requirements elsewhere. The military investigative agencies in overseas locations routinely respond to personnel security investigative leads for DIS.
b. DIS jurisdiction also includes investigation of subversive affiliations, suitability information, and hostage situations when such inquiries are required for personnel security purposes; however, jurisdiction will rest with the military investigative agencies, FBI and/or civil authorities as appropriate when the alleged subversion or suitability issue represents a violation of law or, in the case of a hostage situation, there is an indication that the person concerned is actually being pressured, coerced, or influenced by interests inimical to the United States, or that hostile intelligence is taking action specifically directed against that person. Specific policy guidance on the applicability of these procedures and the jurisdictional considerations are stated in Sec. 154.9.
5. Case Opening
a. A request for investigation must be submitted by using DD Form 1879 and accompanied by supporting documentation unless such documentation is not immediately available, or the obtaining of documentation would compromise a sensitive investigation. Upon receipt of the request, the military investigative component will identify the issue(s), scope the leads, and ensure that the proposed action is that which is authorized for DIS as delineated in this part, 32 CFR part 361 and Defense Investigative Service Manual 201-1.
b. Upon such determination, the Component will prepare an Action Lead Sheet (ALS) which fully identifies the Subject and the scope of the case, and specifies precisely the leads which each investigative component (including DIS/PIC when appropriate) is to conduct.
c. Case opening procedures described above are identical for LAA and post-adjudication cases except with respect to notification of case opening to PIC:
(1) Post-adjudication Cases. These cases, because they involve an issue, are potentially sensitive and must be examined as early as possible by PIC for conformity to the latest DoD policy. Accordingly, the initial notification to PIC of case openings will always be by message. The message will contain at a minimum:
(a) Full identification of the subject;
(b) A narrative describing the allegation/facts in sufficient detail to support opening of the case; and
(c) A brief listing of the leads that are planned.
The DD Form 1879 and supporting documents, along with the agency's ALS, should be subsequently mailed to PIC.
(2) LAA Cases. The notification to PIC of case opening will normally be accomplished by mailing the DD Form 1879, DD Form 398 (Personal History Statement), a copy of the ALS, and any other supporting documents to PIC. Message notification to PIC in LAA cases will only be required if there is a security or suitability issue apparent in the DD Form 1879 or supporting documents.
(d) Beyond initial actions necessary to test allegation for investigative merit and jurisdiction, no further investigative action should commence until the notification of case opening to PIC has been dispatched.
(e) PIC will promptly respond to the notification of case opening by mail or message specifying any qualifying remarks along with a summary of previously existing data. PIC will also provide a DIS case control number (CCN). This number must be used by all components on all case related paperwork/reports.
(The investigating agency may assign its unique service CCN for interim internal control; however, the case will be processed, referenced, and entered into the DCII by the DIS case control number.) The first five digits of the DIS CCN will be the Julian date of the case opening when received at DIS.
6. Case Processing
a. The expected completion time for leads in LAA cases is 50 calendar days and for post-adjudication cases, 30 days, as computed from the date of receipt of the request. If conditions preclude completion in this time period, a pending report of the results to date, along with an estimated date of completion will be submitted to PIC.
b. Copies of all ALSs will be furnished to PIC. In addition, PIC will be promptly notified of any significant change in the scope of the case, or the development of an investigative issue.
c. The procedures for implementing the Privacy Act in PSI cases are set in DIS Manual 20-1-M 1. Any other restrictions on the release of information imposed by an overseas source or by regulations of the country where the inquiry takes place will be clearly stated in the report.
d. The report format for these cases will be that used by the military investigative agency.
e. Investigative action outside the jurisdictional area of an investigative component office may be directed elsewhere by ALS as needed in accordance with that agency's procedures and within the following geographical considerations:
(1) Leads will be sent to PIC if the investigative action is in the United States, District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Bahama Islands, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the following islands in the Pacific: Wake, Midway, Kwajalin, Johnston, Carolines, Marshalls, and Eniwetok.
(2) Leads to areas not listed above may be dispatched to other units of the investigative agency or even to another military agency's field units if there is an agreement or memorandum of understanding that provides for such action. For case accountability purposes, copies of such ``lateral'' leads must be sent to the PIC.
(3) Leads that cannot be dispatched as described in paragraph (2) above, and those that must be sent to a non-DoD investigative agency should be sent to PIC for disposition.
f. The Defense Investigative Manual calls for obtaining PIC approval before conducting a Subject interview on a post-adjudicative investigation. To avoid the delay that compliance with this procedure would create, a military investigative component may conduct the interview provided:
(1) All other investigative leads have been completed and reviewed.
(2) The CCN has been received, signifying DIS concurrence with the appropriateness of the investigation.
(3) Contrary instructions have not been received from the PIC.
(4) The interview is limited to the resolution of the relevant issues disclosed by the investigation.
(1) through (4) of this Appendix, if time is of the essence due to imminent transfer of the subject, a subject interview may be conducted at the discretion of the investigative agency.
7. Case Responsibility LAA and PA
Paragraph 3, above, describes the advantages of timely handling which accrue when the military investigative components act for DIS overseas. These actions for DIS may, however, be limited by the component's staffing and resource limitations, especially since some cases require more administration and management than others. Post-adjudication case leads, for instance, will normally be within the geographical jurisdiction of the component that accepted the request for investigation; therefore, relatively little case management is required. In contrast, LAA cases may require leads world-wide, and, therefore, create more complex case management and administration, especially in the tracking, monitoring and reviewing of leads outside the component's geographical area. Accordingly, an investigative component will accept the case from the requester, but only assign itself the appropriate leads within its own geographical jurisdiction and send the balance to PIC for appropriate disposition in accordance with the following:
a. The investigative agency will accept the request for investigation (thereby saving time otherwise lost in mailing to PIC) but limit its involvement in case management by extracting only those leads it will conduct or manage locally.
b. The agency should then prepare an ALS that shows clearly what leads it will cover and send PIC a copy of this ALS, along with the request for investigation and any other appropriate documentation. It must be clear in the ALS that PIC is to act on all those leads that the unit has not assigned to itself.
c. PIC, as case manager, will assume responsibility for the complete investigative package and, upon receipt of the last lead, will send the results to the appropriate activity.
d. The agency that accepted the case and assigned itself leads may send a copy of its report to the activity in the ``Results to'' block at the same time it sends the originals to PIC. If so, the letter of transmittal must inform the recipient that these reports are only a portion of the investigation, and that the balance will be forthcoming from PIC. Similarly, PIC must be informed of which investigative reports were disseminated. (This is normally done by sending PIC a copy of the letter of transmittal.)
8. Scope
a. LAA. The scope of investigation is 10 years or from age 18, whichever is the shortest period.
b. Post-Adjudication Cases. There is no standard scope. The inquiries conducted will be limited to those necessary to resolve the issue(s).
9. Case Closing: LAA and PA
a. Whether the investigative component or PIC closes out an investigation, there are three key elements to consider:
(1) The investigative results must be reviewed for quality and conformance to policy.
(2) The results must be sent to the activity listed in the ``Results to'' block of the DD Form 1879.
(3) PIC must be informed whether or not any dissemination was made by the investigative agency and, if so, what reports were furnished.
b. Investigative results may also be sent to a requester or higher level activity that makes a statement of need for the results. In such instances, a copy of the letter requesting the results and the corresponding letter of transmittal must be sent to PIC for retention.
c. When an investigative agency disseminates reports for PIC, it may use the transmittal documents, letters, or cover sheets it customarily uses for its own cases.
d. The material that is to be provided to PIC will consist of: The originals of all reports, and all other case documentation such as original statements, confidential source sheets, interview logs, requests for investigation, letters of transmittal to adjudicaters/requesters, or communications with the requester, such as those that modify the scope of the investigation.
e. For DIS to fulfill its responsibilities under DoD 5220.22-R and the Privacy Act of 1974 all inquiries conducted in its behalf must be set forth in an ROI for the permanent file, whether the case is completed, terminated early, or referred to another agency.
10. Referral
A case may require premature closing at any time after receipt of the DD Form 1879 by the investigative component if the information accompanying the request, or that which is later developed, is outside DIS jurisdiction. For example, alleged violations of law, a counterintelligence matter, or actual coercion/influence in a hostage situation (see paragraph 4.b. of this Appendix) must be referred to the appropriate agency, and DIS involvement terminated. The requester will be informed by letter or indorsement to the DD Form 1879 of the information developed that, due to jurisdictional consideration, the case was referred to (fill in appropriate address) and that the DIS case is closed. The agency to which referral was made and PIC will be furnished with the results of all investigations conducted under DIS auspices. DIS, however, has an interest in the referral agency's actions and no information should be solicited from that agency.
Sec. Appendix J to Part 154--ADP Position Categories and Criteria for
Designating Positions
OMB Circular A-71 (and Transmittal Memo B1), July 1978 OMB Circular A-130, December 12, 1985, and FPM Letter 732, November 14, 1978 contain the criteria for designating positions under the existing categories used in the personnel security program for Federal civilian employees as well as the criteria for designating ADP and ADP related positions. This policy is outlined below:
ADP Position Categories
1. Critical-Sensitive Positions
ADP-I positions. Those positions in which the incumbent is responsible for the planning, direction, and implementation of a computer security program; major responsibility for the direction, planning and design of a computer system, including the hardware and software; or, can access a system during the operation or maintenance in such a way, and with a relatively high risk for causing grave damage, or realize a significant personal gain.
2. Noncritical-Sensitive Positions
ADP-II positions. Those positions in which the incumbent is responsible for the direction, planning, design, operation, or maintenance of a computer system, and whose work is technically reviewed by a higher authority of the ADP-I category to insure the integrity of the system.
3. Nonsensitive Positions
ADP-III positions. All other positions involved in computer activities.
In establishing the categories of positions, other factors may enter into the determination, permitting placement in higher or lower categories based on the agency's judgement as to the unique characteristics of the system or the safeguards protecting the system.
Criteria for Designating Positions
Three categories have been established for designating computer and computer-related positions--ADP-I, ADP-II, and ADP-III. Specific criteria for assigning positions to one of these categories is as follows: ------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Criteria------------------------------------------------------------------------ADP-I.......................... Responsibility or the development and
administration of agency computer
security programs, and also including
direction and control of risk analysis
and/or threat assessment.
Significant involvement in life-
critical or mission-critical systems.
Significant involvement in life-
critical or mission-critical systems.
Responsibility for the preparation or
approval of data for input into a
system which does not necessarily
involve personal access to the system,
but with relatively high risk for
effecting grave damage or realizing
significant personal gain.
Relatively high risk assignments
associated with or directly involving
the accounting, disbursement, or
authorization for disbursement from
systems of (1) dollar amounts of $10
million per year or greater, or (2)
lesser amounts if the activities of
the individual are not subject to
technical review by higher authority
in the ADP-I category to ensure the
integrity of the system.
Positions involving major
responsibility for the direction
planning, design, testing,
maintenance, operation, monitoring,
and/or management of systems hardware
and software.
Other positions as designated by the
agency head that involve relatively
high risk for effecting grave damage
or realizing significant personal
gain.ADP-II......................... Responsibility for systems design,
operation, testing, maintenance, and/
or monitoring that is carried out
under technical review of higher
authority in the ADP-I category,
includes, but is not limited to:
(1) access to and/or processing of
proprietary data, information
requiring protection under the Privacy
Act of 1974, and Government-developed
privileged information involving the
award of contracts;
(2) accounting, disbursement, or
authorization for disbursement from
systems of dollar amounts less than
$10 million per year. Other positions
are designated by the agency head that
involve a degree of access to a system
that creates a significant potential
for damage or personal gain less than
that in ADP-I positions.ADP-III........................ All other positions involved in Federal
computer activities.------------------------------------------------------------------------